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The Virtue in Bankruptcy 
Matthew Bruckner 
In response to a gap in the corporate bankruptcy literature, this 
Article offers a new positive theory of corporate bankruptcy law based 
on virtue ethics.  The dominant theory of corporate bankruptcy law—the 
creditors’ bargain model—is necessarily incomplete because it does not 
account for bankruptcy courts’ equitable and discretionary powers, or 
for bankruptcy courts’ need to consider decision-making criteria other 
than economic efficiency.  By contrast, virtue ethics offers insights 
about these features of corporate bankruptcy law for at least three 
reasons.  First, bankruptcy courts appear to give content to bankruptcy 
laws by using virtue ethical principles.  Second, virtue ethics’ decision-
making process—practical wisdom—provides insights into how 
bankruptcy judges balance concerns about efficiency, justice, and 
fairness when reaching decisions.  This is particularly true when the 
bankruptcy court’s equitable jurisdiction or discretionary powers are 
implicated.  Third, virtue ethics’ symbiotic consideration of means and 
ends parallels the process bankruptcy judges are called on to use when 
exercising their discretionary or equitable powers under numerous 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been to 
foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its 
borders.”1 
 
Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity.2  Congress has empowered 
 
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970). 
2. See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (noting bankruptcy courts are courts of 
equity); see also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993) 
(noting that bankruptcy courts are “necessarily entrusted with broad equitable powers”); In re 
SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454  (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that bankruptcy courts have the 
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the bankruptcy courts to modify the contractual relationships between 
debtors and creditors, and to craft flexible remedies designed to ensure 
“complete justice” is done.3  To provide complete justice for parties to a 
bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy judge must consider principles such as 
equity, honesty, fairness, and justice.4  These principles must be 
considered for at least two reasons.  First, the bankruptcy laws often 
specifically direct the bankruptcy courts to consider such principles.5  
Second, as courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are obligated to “prevent 
injustice or unfairness in the administration of bankruptcy estates.”6  As 
a result, bankruptcy judges regularly “eschew[] mechanical rules” to 
ensure that the bankruptcy process achieves fair and just results.7 
The Bankruptcy Code8 also commits a substantial number of 
 
“equitable authority to ensure ‘that substance will not give way to form, that technical 
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done’” (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295, 305 (1939))).  But see Hon. Alan M. Ahart, A Stern Reminder that the Bankruptcy 
Court is not a Court of Equity, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 200 (2012) (concluding that a 
bankruptcy court is not one of equity). 
3. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 340 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that bankruptcy 
courts have broad authority to act to prevent injustice); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
Congress’ regulation did not alter bankruptcy courts’ fundamental nature). 
4. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d at 340 (noting that because bankruptcy courts are 
courts of equity, they must invoke equitable principles like fairness and justice); see also 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007) (denying conversion of a Chapter 7 
proceeding to a Chapter 13 proceeding in spite of language in the Bankruptcy Code suggesting 
that conversion was mandatory because of dishonesty by the debtor). 
5. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012) (providing that prepetition security agreements 
cover related postpetition property unless “the equities of the case” require otherwise); id. §§ 
1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(g)(3) (allowing the rejection or modification of collective bargaining 
agreements and retirements savings plans, respectively, only if “all creditors, the debtor and all of 
the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); id. § 1129(b) (allowing cramdown unless 
the plan discriminates unfairly, or if it is not “fair and equitable”); see also Allied Signal 
Recovery Trust v. Allied Signal, Inc., 298 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (“‘[E]quitable’ is defined 
as ‘signal[ing] that which is reasonable, fair, or appropriate.’” (quoting Things Remembered, Inc. 
v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))); In re Patio & Porch Sys., Inc., 
194 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (“This ‘equities of the case’ provision is intended to 
prevent secured creditors from receiving windfalls and to allow bankruptcy courts broad 
discretion in balancing the interests of secured creditors against the general policy of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which favors giving debtors a ‘fresh start.’”); In re Crouch, 51 B.R. 331, 332 
(Bankr. D. Or. 1985) (discussing § 552(b)’s “equities of the case” rule). 
6. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d at 340 (citing Pepper, 308 U.S. 295 at 305).  In a 
number of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges are specifically directed to 
consider principles such as justice, fairness, honesty, and equity in rendering decisions.  See, e.g., 
11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (providing that collective bargaining agreements can only be rejected if 
“the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection”); see also id. § 1114(g)(3) (stating that 
certain pension plans are only subject to modification if “all of the affected parties are treated 
fairly and equitably, and is clearly favored by the balance of the equities”). 
7. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). 
8. This Article uses the terms “Bankruptcy Code” and “Code” to refer to the Bankruptcy 
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decisions to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge.9  For example, the 
Bankruptcy Code empowers bankruptcy judges to confirm a plan of 
reorganization, provided that the plan is feasible.10  However, the Code 
does not define feasibility, nor does it provide any substantive guidance 
as to how feasibility should be determined.11  Instead, the Code 
empowers bankruptcy courts to use their discretion to determine the 
relevant considerations in a particular case and then to apply those 
factors to the facts of that case.12 
 
Reform Act of 1978.  Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C. (2012)). 
9. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105; id. § 107(c)(1); id. § 303; id. § 324; id. § 349; id. § 350; id. § 
362; id. § 363; id. § 365; id. § 502; id. § 503; id. § 1104; id. § 1112; id. § 1113; id. § 1114; id. § 
1121; id. § 1129; see also In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[A] 
bankruptcy judge must not be shackled with unnecessarily rigid rules when exercising the 
undoubtedly broad administrative power granted him under the [Bankruptcy] Code.”).  Precisely 
how much discretion bankruptcy judges possess is hotly contested.  See, e.g., Law v. Siegel (In re 
Law), 435 Fed. Appx. 697, 698 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
“properly affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order granting the trustee’s surcharge motion because 
the surcharge was calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by 
the debtor’s misconduct and was warranted to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process” 
(citing Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 786 (9th Cir. 2004)), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 
(2013); cf. Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 
13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 153–54 (2005). 
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (stating that the court shall not confirm a plan unless it finds 
that “[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for 
further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless 
such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan”); see also In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. 238, 
256–57 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012) (describing how feasibility is required for confirmation). 
11. “Feasibility” is a shorthand reference to the requirements of § 1129(a)(11) of the United 
States Code.  See In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. at 256. 
12. In response, bankruptcy courts have generally considered factors such as the debtor’s 
proposed capital structure, the earning power of the business, economic conditions, the ability of 
the debtor’s management, and the probability that existing management will remain in place.  See 
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941); see also In re Nellson 
Nutraceutical, Inc., No. 06-10072, 2007 WL 201134, at *27–28 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2007) 
(citing Consolidated Rock Prods. with approval for the proposition that an estimate of earning 
capacity must be based on all relevant facts); In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. at 257 (“Courts have 
employed the following factors in determining whether a plan is feasible: the debtor’s capital 
structure, the earning power of the business, economic conditions, the ability of debtor’s 
management, the probability of continuation of management, and other related matter (citing In re 
Mortg. Inv. Co. of El Paso, 111 B. R. 604, 611 n.8 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990))).  However, the test 
is a loose one that allows courts to weigh the various factors at their discretion, including 
weighing any particular factor at zero.  See Harbin v. IndyMac Bank FSB (In re Harbin), 486 
F.2d 510, 521 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that bankruptcy courts may exercise equitable discretion); 
see also In re Geijsel, 480 B.R. at 257 (noting that bankruptcy courts may ignore various factors 
(citing In re Landing Assocs., Ltd. 157 B.R. 791, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993))); NATHALIE 
MARTIN & OCEAN TAMA, INSIDE BANKRUPTCY LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 178 (2008) 
(“[T]he feasibility test is applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis within the very broad 
discretion of the bankruptcy court.”); Robert A. Sauro, Chapter 11 Confirmation: Increasing 
Judicial Discretion, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 191, 206 (1987) (noting that courts consider many factors 
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Existing bankruptcy scholarship has addressed neither the role of 
bankruptcy courts as courts of equity nor their substantial discretionary 
powers.13  Instead, scholars have largely focused on debating the 
appropriate goals for our bankruptcy laws.14  Some scholars have 
 
when determining feasibility). 
13. But see KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY 
SYSTEM 216 (1999) (criticizing textualist interpretations of the Code and claiming that judges 
must be able to look to policies that lay behind the text in order to reach correct decisions). 
14. Compare Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Financial and Political 
Theories] (arguing that the “common pool” justification for corporate bankruptcy—which asserts 
that bankruptcy “provides for an orderly disposition of claims against a debtor firm,” thereby 
preserving “intact the firm’s ‘common pool’”—is unsatisfactory), Philippe Aghion et al., 
Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 851–52 (1994) [hereinafter Aghion, 
Improving Bankruptcy] (arguing that “a good bankruptcy procedure” should “try to achieve an ex 
post efficient outcome,” “give managers the right ex ante incentives to avoid bankruptcy,” 
“preserve absolute priority,” and “put ultimate decisionmaking power in the hands of the 
claimants”), Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
523, 532–33 (1992) [hereinafter Aghion, Economics of Bankruptcy Reform] (arguing that “a good 
bankruptcy procedure is one that . . . maximizes the ex post value of the firm . . . [and] preserves 
the (ex ante) bonding role of debt by penalizing management adequately in bankruptcy states 
(emphasis omitted)), Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 97 (1984) (rejecting the notion “that a 
bankruptcy proceeding provides . . . an essentially unlimited opportunity to do what appears at the 
moment to be good, just, or fair,” and arguing that bankruptcy serves “a unique, but limited, 
function in our society”), Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for 
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1089 (1992) (arguing that “Chapter 11 should be repealed and 
replaced”), Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 871–72 (1982) (arguing that bankruptcy law does not faithfully 
mirror the creditors’ bargain model), and Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu 
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 100 (1992) (discussing the “selections 
that should be on a congressionally enacted [bankruptcy] menu”), with Susan Block-Lieb, The 
Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 519 (2001) (asserting that 
both “[c]ommentators applying an economic analysis” of bankruptcy law and their critics “could 
learn from the other”), Linda J. Rusch, Bankruptcy Reorganization Jurisprudence: Matters of 
Belief, Faith, and Hope—Stepping into the Fourth Dimension, 55 MONT. L. REV. 9, 17–22 (1994) 
(describing the two competing paradigms of bankruptcy reorganization: the creditors’ bargain and 
loss allocation), Charles J. Tabb, Of Contractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A Skeptical View, 
12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2004) (“[A] non-waiveable bankruptcy system, with 
a supervised bankruptcy process, and a non-waiveable discharge right, are not only important, but 
necessary and essential.”), Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 778 
(1987) [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policy] (contrasting her own views of bankruptcy with 
those of Professor Douglas Baird), Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect 
World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 338–86 [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking] 
(discussing “the various and competing goals that underlie the bankruptcy system”), and 
Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 467 (1992) 
[hereinafter Warren, Untenable Case] (arguing that while bankruptcy does function “to preserve 
value in faltering businesses and to enhance the return to all those who have an interest in the 
business” as argued by Bradley and Rosenzweig, “it also serves to redistribute value”); see also 
Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 850 n.47 (2005); Irit 
Haviv-Segal, Bankruptcy Law and Inefficient Entitlements 4–12 (2004) (unpublished 
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advanced a view of bankruptcy based on the so-called creditors’ bargain 
model.15  They suggest that bankruptcy laws should only seek to 
accomplish two things: (i) maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate 
and (ii) respect ex ante contractual entitlements to the greatest extent 
possible.16  Other scholars have taken a wider view and suggest that 
bankruptcy laws are appropriately focused on reorganizing struggling 
businesses, preserving jobs, protecting taxing authorities, redistributing 
assets, enhancing community stability, and other similar aims.17  
Missing from the debate, however, has been an attempt to develop a 
positive theory of bankruptcy law that adequately explains the most 
salient features of our current bankruptcy system, including the 
equitable and discretionary powers of bankruptcy courts, and Congress’ 
decision to privilege decision-making criteria other than economic 
efficiency.18 
 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=612981 (noting that 
the “main conflict between different approaches of bankruptcy law is the familiar one between 
the economic and social approaches,” and discussing these approaches). 
15. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 17 (1986) 
(noting that “[b]ankruptcy provides a way to override the creditors’ pursuit of their own remedies 
and to make them work together”); cf. Richard V. Butler & Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination 
of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 270–71 (1994); 
Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 759, 764–65 (2011) (assuming that the creditors’ bargain model is an appropriate 
framework).  But see Thomas H. Jackson & Robert Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay 
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 202 (1989) (retreating 
from an earlier normative position and concluding that “a single-minded focus on preserving the 
value of prebankruptcy entitlements is not necessarily the optimal means of mirroring a 
hypothetical ex ante bargain among the creditors”). 
16. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 24 (“Bankruptcy law is best approached by separating . . . 
the question of how the process can maximize the value of a given pool of assets and the question 
of how the law should allocate entitlements.”); see also Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 15, at 270–
71 (describing that the two goals of bankruptcy are maximizing values and dealing with 
allocating entitlements); Casey, supra note 15, at 766 (noting that the “only goal of bankruptcy 
law is to maximize the value of the firm in bankruptcy”); Jackson & Scott, supra note 15, at 170. 
17. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 14, at 776, 788 (asserting that bankruptcy 
serves “‘the public interest’ beyond the interests of the disputing parties” in recognition “of the 
larger implications of a debtor’s widespread default and the consequences of permitting a few 
creditors to force a business to close”); see also Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 
S.C. L. REV. 791, 804 (noting that the greater good of the community has always been relevant to 
bankruptcy policy); Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 14, at 355 (recognizing the 
Code gives protection to persons with no formal legal rights); Warren, Untenable Case, supra 
note 14, at 467 (stating that bankruptcy serves to redistribute value); Haviv-Segal, supra note 14, 
at 11 (“[A]dvocates of the social approaches stress the numerous aims and values that form the 
basis of bankruptcy law.”). 
18. Although they do not address themselves to these points, some scholars have offered 
normative theories of bankruptcy from outside the dominant perspective.  See, e.g., GROSS, supra 
note 13 (justifying the “fresh start” for individual and business debtors, explaining why some 
creditors are more deserving of payment than others, and justifying the role of community in the 
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This Article seeks to fill the gap in the corporate bankruptcy literature 
by offering a new, positive theory of bankruptcy law based on virtue 
ethics.19  Virtue ethics is one of the three major schools of moral 
philosophy,20 and offers a normative account of how citizens should 
live their lives so that they might achieve eudaimonia (human 
flourishing).21  Eudaimonia is the ultimate good: the goal that 
individuals (and the law)22 should work to achieve.23  Achieving the 
ultimate good is only possible if individuals act virtuously.24  Virtuous 
 
bankruptcy process); Donald Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of 
Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin, Normative Foundations] 
(offering a “bankruptcy choice model”); Donald Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A 
Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991) [hereinafter Korobkin, 
Rehabilitating Values] (offering a “values-based account”); Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team 
Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741 (2004) [hereinafter 
LoPucki, Team Production Theory] (offering a team production account); Ronald Mann, 
Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money is it Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 993 (1995) (proposing a theoretical justification for the distributive aspects of the 
bankruptcy system). 
19. See infra Part I (discussing existing bankruptcy theory and the need for an alternative).  
For the purposes of this project, all references to virtue ethics should be considered as references 
to the “broad range of theories of practical philosophy that . . . place high priority on virtue and 
on happiness.”  Eric R. Claeys, Response: Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 889, 891 (2008).  Although many contemporary virtue theorists work within 
the “neo-Aristotelian” framework (or the closely related neo-Thomistic tradition), there are 
exceptions.  This Article draws heavily from Aristotelian understandings of virtue ethics, but also 
from other sources, particularly Rosalind Hursthouse and Alasdair MacIntyre.  See ROSALIND 
HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999) [hereinafter HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS]; 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1981). 
20. Deontology and consequentialism being the other two traditions.  See Lee J. Strang, 
Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1997, 2017 (2012) (recognizing that the “two other competing ethical traditions are deontology 
and consequentialism”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 118 (describing Arisotelianism 
as “philosophically the most powerful of pre-modern modes of moral thought”). 
21. Eudaimonia means something akin to ultimate happiness, human flourishing, or the 
qualities necessary to lead a good life.  See, e.g., Peter Koller, Law, Morality, and Virtue, in 
WORKING VIRTUE: VIRTUE ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 191, 192 (Rebecca 
L. Walker & Philip L. Ivanhoe eds., 2007) (defining eudaimonia as “a human life that is 
intrinsically good from the individual’s viewpoint and the general perspective as well”); see also 
MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 147–48 (noting the link between virtue and happiness); ROBERT 
C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS 105 
(1992) (describing eudaimonia as “‘flourishing or doing well’” (citations omitted)). 
22. See Chapin F. Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703, 715 (2009) 
[hereinafter Cimino, Virtue and Contract] (noting Aristotle’s belief in government’s obligation to 
train its citizens to be virtuous). 
23. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, reprinted in ARISTOTLE: SELECTIONS 347, 350 
(Terence Irwin & Gail Fine trans., 1995) (noting that happiness “is the highest of all the goods 
pursued”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 147–48 (noting the link between virtue and 
happiness); SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 106 (noting that happiness is the ultimate end to be 
pursued). 
24. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 371–72 (“It should be said, then, that every virtue 
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action takes practice, and only by repeated, conscious efforts to 
internalize virtuous behavior is eudaimonia achievable.25 
Virtue jurisprudence differs from consequentialist theories of law, 
such as the creditors’ bargain model, because it does not focus on 
achieving a single type of outcome in all cases, such as the most 
efficient outcome.26  And, although it aims to promote the end of human 
flourishing, virtue jurisprudence is not outcome-centered in the same 
sense as the creditors’ bargain model.27  Eudaimonia—the outcome 
virtue ethics seeks to promote—is both an internal and a multi-variable 
concept.28  As such, promoting the ability of each person to achieve 
eudaimonia may involve trade-offs between and among individuals, 
trade-offs that may be irreducible to a single, decision-making criteria, 
such as efficiency.29 
Virtue ethics promises to offer insight into our bankruptcy laws for at 
least three reasons.  First, virtue jurisprudence and bankruptcy law are 
both moored on similar values and principles.30  Bankruptcy law, like 
 
causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well . . . .”); see also 
Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 713 (“At its broadest level, Aristotelian virtue 
causes human beings to be happy and function well.”). 
25. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 4–5 (1992) (noting that acting virtuously must be 
practiced in order to be fully developed). 
26. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 367 (“[Q]uestions about actions and expediency, like 
questions about health, have no fixed and invariable answers.”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 
19, at 149; Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 715 (noting that virtue jurisprudence 
does not focus on a single type of outcome). 
27. An outcome-centered theory must offer a theory for what should count as the good, right, 
just, or legally valid decision.  Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, A Virtue-Centered 
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 184 (2003) [hereinafter Solum, Theory of 
Judging].  For example, law and economics typically offers the maximization of preference 
satisfaction as the preferred outcome for decisions.  See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 15, at 222; 
Aghion, Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 14, at 543 (noting that shareholders hold 
value maximization as a “common objective”).  Virtue ethics focuses on achieving human 
flourishing, which may require different outcomes in difference cases.  But see MACINTYRE, 
supra note 19, at 185 (noting Benjamin Franklin’s emphasis on a utilitarian variety of virtue 
ethics). 
28. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 751 (2009) (arguing that human flourishing is a multivariable concept and 
that the multiple relevant components of human flourishing are incommensurable); see also 
MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 184 (noting the incommensurability of “internal goods and 
external goods”). 
29. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 198–99 (“[T]he notion of summing goods . . . in terms 
of one single formula or conception of utility . . . makes no sense.”). 
30. Professor Lawrence B. Solum has coined the phrase “virtue jurisprudence” to refer to “a 
normative and explanatory theory of law that utilises [sic] the resources of virtue epistemology, 
virtue ethics, and virtue politics to answer the central questions of legal theory.”  Solum, Theory 
of Judging, supra note 27, at 178; see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 707 
(noting that some in the legal academy have coined the phrase “virtue jurisprudence”).  This 
Article will use Professor Solum’s phrase to refer to virtue ethics as applied to legal problems. 
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most law, was shaped by values and principles such as fairness, justice, 
equity, honesty, and loyalty that underlie common notions of morality.31  
These concerns also lay at the heart of virtue jurisprudence.  As such, 
virtue jurisprudential concerns about fairness, justice, and equity are 
often explicitly considered and cited by bankruptcy judges.32  The 
content of these often-cited principles appears to be derived from virtue 
ethics.33  At a minimum, virtue ethics may offer insight into what 
judges mean when they write that “justice” or “fairness” dictates a result 
in a particular case.34  As such, understanding virtue jurisprudence helps 
to explain bankruptcy law. 
Second, virtue jurisprudence’s decision theory (practical wisdom) 
provides useful insights into how bankruptcy judges decide cases.35  
 
31. See In re Federated Dep’t Stores Inc., 44 F.3d 1310, 1320 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Despite our 
holding today, we believe denying all compensation to Lehman Brothers would not be 
equitable.”); In re Greystone Holdings, L.L.C., 305 B.R. 456, 463 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(noting the demands of fairness and equity on its decision); In re Edwards, 228 B.R. 552, 562 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that bankruptcy courts have “ample latitude to strike a satisfactory 
balance between the relevant factors of fairness, finality, integrity and maximization of assets”); 
see also JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
148–51 (1991) [hereinafter GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS] (discussing the origins of 
unconscionability); Bailey Kuklin, “You Should Have Known Better,” 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 545, 
576 (2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword: Constitutions and 
Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56–73 (2007); 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 478 
(2005). 
32. See, e.g., Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477 (1968) (noting the Bankruptcy Code’s 
“decisive, statutory objective: fairness to all persons having claims against an insolvent”); see 
also In re SubMicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 449 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting bankruptcy courts’ 
“equitable authority to ensure ‘that substance will not give way to form, that technical 
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done’” (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 
308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939))); Onick v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 
2002) (asserting that the interests of “‘fairness, equality, and predictability’” justified its holding 
(internal citations omitted)); Matthew Nozemack, Note, Making Sense Out of Bankruptcy Courts’ 
Recharacterization of Claims: Why Not Use § 510(c) Equitable Subordination?, 56 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 689 (1999) (examining the authority of bankruptcy courts to subordinate claims on 
equitable grounds). 
33. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 192 (discussing the requirements of justice and 
courage). 
34. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a 
proferred reading of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 because of the 
“unfair result” that would follow); see also In re Federated Dept. Stores Inc., 44 F.3d at 1320 
(“[W]e are of the view that fairness and equity dictate allowing Lehamn Brothers to be 
compensated . . . .”); In re Greystone, 305 B.R. at 463 (noting the demands of fairness and equity 
on its decision); In re Edwards, 228 B.R. at 562 (noting that bankruptcy courts have “ample 
latitude to strike a satisfactory balance between the relevant factors of fairness, finality, integrity 
and maximization of assets”). 
35. See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 12 (discussing practical wisdom).  
Practical wisdom has variously been referred to as prudence, practical reason, phronesis, and 
situation-sense.  See Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence, in VIRTUE 
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Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that helps decision makers 
make good decisions, even when several potentially competing virtues 
apply to a particular situation and appear to call for disparate results.36  
Bankruptcy judges often must decide how to balance uncertain, 
indeterminate, or incommensurate37 values or policies in order to reach 
the correct result in a particular case; virtue ethics may offer some 
insights into how they do so.  Practical wisdom offers insights that can 
help explain how bankruptcy judges perform this balancing act because 
the process of choosing among competing bankruptcy policies is similar 
to the process of choosing among competing virtues.38 
Finally, virtue jurisprudence calls for a decision maker to 
simultaneously consider both the means and the ends of the law in a 
“fully symbiotic way.”39  Virtue jurisprudence’s symbiotic 
consideration of means and ends allows virtue ethics to offer insights 
into the decision-making process of judges who are considering whether 
to authorize discretionary relief.40  A virtue jurisprudential approach 
 
JURISPRUDENCE 1, 52–53 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) (describing the 
decision-making process of virtue ethics); Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 88, 91 (noting the many names authors have given to the Aristotelian 
notion of phronesis). 
36. See Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 84 (2006) [hereinafter, 
Solum, Natural Justice] (describing practical wisdom); see also HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, 
supra note 19, at 40 (noting that practical wisdom is required to interpret rules and determine 
which rules are most appropriately applied). 
37. A claim of incommensurability suggests that certain ends cannot be traded off for one 
another, and thus denies that certain ends can be evaluated by a unitary metric—therefore, any 
attempt to introduce such a metric would misdescribe the human experience.  See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 800 (1994) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability].  For example, human beings need food, clothing, and 
shelter to survive.  At some minimum threshold, these are incommensurable needs.  One cannot 
trade all of one’s food for additional shelter and hope to survive.  A person needs a minimum 
amount of each in order to live.  The creditors’ bargain model depends on an assumption of 
commensurability.  Otherwise, a single variable decision-making criteria, such as efficiency, 
would be useless. 
38. Aristotle appears to have believed that virtues were never in conflict and that a truly 
virtuous person could reconcile the apparently (but not actually) conflicting demands of different 
virtues.  This has led some to suggest that Aristotle was a value monist and would deny the 
existence of plural values, which appears to be a necessary pre-condition for a claim of 
incommensurability.  See Ruth Elizabeth Chang, Value Pluralism, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 16139, 16139 (James Wright ed., 
2012) (noting that Aristotle was arguably a proponent of value monism).  Neo-Aristotelian theory 
is much more sympathetic to arguments that plural and potentially incommensurable values exist.  
See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 168 (arguing that moral Aristotelianism is not “necessarily 
committed to a strong thesis concerning the unity of virtues”).  This Article draws on neo-
Aristotelian theories on this issue. 
39. Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 712. 
40. See id. (asserting that “virtue theory may better account for contract’s dual dimensions”). 
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requires decision makers to consider whether to authorize discretionary 
relief to consider two questions: (i) what ends does the Bankruptcy 
Code seek to achieve; and (ii) what is the best way to achieve those 
ends.41  Virtue ethics’ dual focus better42 accounts for how bankruptcy 
judges decide whether to grant discretionary relief because it parallels 
the requirements of many sections of the Bankruptcy Code.  Virtue 
ethics, like the Code, calls on a bankruptcy judge to consider the 
purpose of the relevant provision: both what it seeks to achieve and how 
best to achieve that goal.43 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows.  Part I 
discusses the dominant model of bankruptcy theory—the creditors’ 
bargain.  After providing a brief overview of this theory, this Part 
focuses on one particular flaw of the creditors’ bargain: its focus on 
efficiency poorly explains existing corporate bankruptcy doctrine.  Part 
I also explains why a new theory of corporate bankruptcy law would be 
useful.  Part II introduces virtue ethics and explains three key features of 
virtue jurisprudence that allow it to provide an attractive descriptive 
account of corporate bankruptcy law.44  Part III provides three specific 
examples where virtue jurisprudence more accurately explains current 
bankruptcy doctrine.  A conclusion follows. 
I. EXISTING BANKRUPTCY THEORY AND THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE 
A. The Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
The creditors’ bargain has been the dominant theory of bankruptcy 
law for decades,45 and although several other normative theories of 
 
41. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing virtue jurisprudence’s consideration of means and ends). 
42. Virtue ethics offers a “better” approach than other theories because it calls for an analysis 
more closely aligned with the text of the Code itself.  See Paul R. Thagard, The Best Explanation: 
Criteria for Theory Choice, 75 J. PHIL. 76, 79 (1978) (stating that theories are comparable based 
on their “consilience,” which is a measure of how much a particular theory explains—if an 
alternative theory has greater consilience, it might fairly be said to be a better theory). 
43. Cf. Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 737 (noting that “a court would . . . 
inquir[e] into the parties’ goals for both the means and the ends of the contract” (emphasis in 
original)). 
44. Virtue jurisprudence may also offer an attractive normative account of bankruptcy law, 
but the normative implications of virtue ethics are beyond the scope of this Article.  I expect to 
address the normative implications of virtue jurisprudence for bankruptcy law in a follow-up 
article. 
45. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. SYMES, STATUTORY PRIORITIES IN CORPORATE 
INSOLVENCY LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS 70 (2008) (noting the 
dominance of the creditors’ bargain theory); Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics 
of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1454 (2012) (same); Rolef J. de Weijs, Too Big to Fail 
as a Game of Chicken with the State: What Insolvency Law Theory has to say about TBTF and 
Vice Versa 3 (Amsterdam Law School, Research Paper No. 2012-90, 2012), available at 
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bankruptcy law exist,46 none have had as profound an impact as that 
model.  The creditors’ bargain model is a “contractarian” approach to 
bankruptcy law derived from early law and economics theory.47  
Originally proposed by Thomas Jackson, the creditors’ bargain model 
claims that bankruptcy should mirror the hypothetical agreement 
creditors would be expected to form among themselves if they were 
able to negotiate from a pre-bankruptcy position.48  As originally stated, 
the creditors’ bargain model tells us that the optimal bankruptcy system 
should have only two aims: (i) respect nonbankruptcy contractual rights, 
such as state law priority schemes; and (ii) maximize the expected value 
of the assets of the bankruptcy estate.49 
The creditors’ bargain model makes a number of assumptions 
common to classical law and economics, including that actors are 
entirely rational welfare maximizers, and that the costs and benefits of 
any action can be compared along a single, scalar metric.50  The 
creditors’ bargain model also assumes that parties51 would not strike a 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145861 (same). 
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that some scholars have taken a wider 
view of bankruptcy law); see also Donald Korobkin, The Role of Normative Theory in 
Bankruptcy Debates, 82 IOWA L. REV. 75, 78–79 [hereinafter Korobkin, Normative Theory] 
(noting that while many traditionalists “maintain that bankruptcy law should pursue the full range 
of purposes that it currently does . . . they also seem to dismiss the use of normative theory to 
support this view”); Levitin, supra note 45, at 1452. 
47. See LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra note 18, at 744 (discussing this point); see 
also Levitin, supra note 45, at 1405 (same). 
48. Jackson, supra note 14, at 860.  But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors’ 
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1896 (1994) (claiming that the available data suggest that “a 
substantial portion of all unsecured creditors do not consent to their status in any meaningful 
sense.”); Nathalie Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside 
Looking In, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 485 (1998) (noting that “many creditors—including utilities, 
taxing authorities, tort claimants, and environmental claimants had no intention of ever lending 
money to the debtor”). 
49. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
50. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 18–19 (discussing two bankruptcy assumptions—(1) 
“insolvency occurs without warning” and (2) “bankruptcy proceedings take no time”—and, while 
acknowledging that these two assumptions are “somewhat unrealistic,” asserting that imposing 
these assumptions “clarifies several key features of bankruptcy law”); see also SOLOMON, supra 
note 21, at 220 (discussing the concept of “[h]omo economicus who has no attachments or affects 
other than crude self-interest and the ability to calculate how to satisfy that interest vis-à-vis other 
people”); supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that the creditors’ bargain model is based 
on an assumption of incommensurability). 
51. Professor Jackson expects that debtors would negotiate with their shareholders and 
creditors, but would exclude non-creditor employees, local communities, taxing authorities and 
other similar interests.  JACKSON, supra note 15, at 222; see also Martin, supra note 48, at 439 
(asserting that Chapter 11’s rehabilitative goals “run not merely to the reorganizing company, its 
creditors, and shareholders, but also to third party interests”).  But see SOLOMON, supra note 21, 
at 231. 
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hypothetical bargain unless it was in their interests to do so.52  In other 
words, bargains are only struck when they are efficient and maximize 
value.53  These assumptions lead creditors’ bargain theorists to suggest 
that considering non-creditor interests or distributing estate assets other 
than in accordance with non-bankruptcy law is per se improper.54  For 
example, when a debtor is deciding whether to continue its business as a 
going concern or liquidate, its only considerations should be to 
maximize returns to creditors (even at the expense of non-creditors) and 
to ensure that non-bankruptcy rights are respected.55  Under the 
creditors’ bargain theory, debtors should consider only the best interests 
of its creditors, and not whether reorganization or liquidation would be 
in the interests of employees, taxing authorities, or the local community, 
among others.56 
B. Flaws with the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
The creditors’ bargain theory has been heavily criticized for its 
assumptions, methodology, and the ends it pursues.57  The most cogent 
 
52. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 59 n.80 (“[I]t is unlikely that secured creditors would 
agree to the bargain unless they received some of the gains resulting from the bargain.”). 
53. This assumption has recently been called into question by a number of scholars.  See, e.g., 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648 (2010); Richard 
A. Both, The New Shareholder and the Current Financial Crisis: Things Happen, 55 VILL. L. 
REV. 57, 68 (2010); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1987, 1988–90, 2016 (2002); Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How 
Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615 (2011) (asserting that creditors’ behavior 
is influenced by financial regulation and regulatory policy). 
54. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 214–15; see also LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra 
note 18, at 749 (noting that “[a]ny consideration of non-creditor interests . . . would be 
inefficient” according to the creditors’ bargain theory).  But see Wei Zhang, The Paradoxes of 
Secured Lending: Is there a Less Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy 
42 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1986908 (arguing that efficiency—at least in the context of secured lending—“goes 
hand in hand with its distributional effects”). 
55. See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 24 (arguing that incorporating the policy of preserving 
jobs into a bankruptcy statute “would be to mix apples and oranges”); see also LoPucki, Team 
Production Theory, supra note 18, at 748–49 (noting that the creditors’ bargain theory is only 
concerned with creditor interests).   
56. It is unclear how the creditors’ bargain theory would account for assertions that creditor 
behavior is not always value maximizing.  If creditors’ bargain theorists would acknowledge that 
creditors may properly pursue individually (but not collectively) wealth maximizing strategies, 
see, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 53, at 651, they might have to reconsider whether 
bankruptcy courts should protect non-creditor interests.  Cf. Martin, supra note 48, at 429–30 
(discussing non-creditor interests). 
57. See, e.g., Jane Baron & Jeff Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of 
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 449 (1996) (“To assume, as 
economists do, the appropriateness of economic analysis is to evade what is actually the prior and 
deeper ethical question.”); Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract 
Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 715–16 (1980) (challenging certain empirical assumptions 
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criticisms are that the creditors’ bargain model: (i) makes assumptions 
that are too crude to yield accurate predictions about bankruptcy law;58 
(ii) fails to acknowledge that sophisticated creditors have impliedly 
consented to the current bankruptcy regime;59 and (iii) is a flawed 
normative theory.60  Space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of 
the theory’s many flaws, and this Article will focus on only one: the 
disjunction between the theory’s singular focus on economic efficiency 
and Chapter 11’s focus on other norms.  However, even if the creditors’ 
bargain model were a fault-free normative account of bankruptcy law, 
an alternative approach would still be useful because the creditors’ 
bargain fails to account for several key features of bankruptcy law. 
A gap exists in the corporate bankruptcy literature because existing 
theories, including the creditors’ bargain model, cannot and do not 
accurately describe how Chapter 11 actually works.61  Economic 
analysis tends to assume that the parties’ intent can be uncovered by 
applying an efficiency norm, but for many corporate debtors and their 
creditors (including non-contractual creditors) there are other norms at 
work that may be more important to understanding the parties’ intent.62  
 
relied on by the creditors’ bargain theorists); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 428 (1981); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1994) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations] (asserting that law and 
economics assumptions are “too crude, so oversimple that they fail to single out those aspects of 
the world that are most salient for predictive purposes.”); Eduardo M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 823 n.5 (2009) (noting that the “literature critiquing law and economics is 
vast and rich” and citing “a few prominent examples,” including Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, 
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 521 (1980) (critiquing wealth 
maximization as an efficiency criteria)); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 614 (2009) 
[hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11] (criticizing a creditors’ bargain 
study for lack of proper explanation of methodology and other missing data). 
58. See e.g., Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 114–16; Woo, supra note 53, at 
1617; see also Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 794 (“[W]ith the assumption of a 
unitary kind of valuation, we will sometimes offer inadequate predictions . . . .”). 
59. See LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra note 18, at 756–57 (2004) (suggesting that 
sophisticated creditors who do not segregate their assets into bankruptcy-remote entities have 
implicitly opted-in to the current bankruptcy system); cf. Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, 
No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
5 (2013) (same). 
60. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 787–88 
(1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning]. 
61. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, Methodological Realities, and the 
Paradigm Dominance Game, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1308 (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki, 
Reorganization Realities] (“Economists who work on bankruptcy tend to slip off into the world of 
perfect markets and zero transaction costs . . . .”). 
62. Multiple interests are typically at work.  Even when one of those rationales is efficiency, a 
theory that focuses exclusively on efficiency can be problematic.  See, e.g., In re Cardelucci, 285 
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The creditors’ bargain fails to account for behavior that is guided by 
forces other than efficiency, even though corporate bankruptcy law is 
clearly guided by other social norms and moral intuitions.63  Even if the 
creditors’ bargain model were capable of accurately predicting the 
behavior of insolvent or bankrupt companies, if the model 
misunderstands the underlying motivations of actors, it may offer 
seriously flawed policy prescriptions.64 
The Bankruptcy Code specifically directs courts to consider non-
efficiency rationales,65 but the creditors’ bargain model’s relentless 
focus on efficiency blinds it to these directions.66  Bankruptcy law 
appears to be grounded in the same principles of fairness and justice 
that undergird other areas of law and, like other areas of law, expects 
that individuals will act reasonably, diligently, and carefully.67  
Bankruptcy law is exceptionally concerned with these values.  Both as a 
matter of statutory command, and as a result of bankruptcy courts’ role 
as courts of equity, bankruptcy judges have a greater obligation than 
most judges to ensure that “substantial justice” is done.68 
The creditors’ bargain model cannot adequately explain bankruptcy 
 
F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “two interests, fairness among creditors and 
administrative efficiency,” are often both relevant to bankruptcy cases); see also SOLOMON, 
supra note 21, at 127 (noting that even corporations consider virtues other than efficiency to be 
relevant); Woo, supra note 53, at 1617–18 (arguing that bank regulation can explain decisions to 
pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing). 
63. See David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 577, 613–14 (1989); see also Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 757–61 
(discussing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 97 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), and concluding that 
the case “displays the bankruptcy process as rich, complex, and evolutionary, allowing expression 
and recognition of diverse human values”); Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal 
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 122 (1979) (“Wealth is an important element in most people’s 
preferences . . . but it is not the sum total of those preferences.”); Sunstein, Incommensurability, 
supra note 37, at 794; Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating 
Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (2008). 
64. See Penalver, supra note 57, at 841 (noting that the “potential for misunderstanding is 
independently significant because it can result in seriously flawed policy prescriptions”); see also 
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 762 (arguing that, at best, the economic 
account of bankruptcy law “offers an undermining explanation of a bankruptcy system that 
recognizes noneconomic outcomes,” and, at worst, “does not explain ‘bankruptcy law’ at all, but 
merely restates its own economic assumptions”). 
65. See supra note 5 (citing provisions of the Code). 
66. To be fair, the creditors’ bargain theory seeks to critique bankruptcy for its inefficiencies, 
and so it is not unexpected that it fails to engage with the Code’s non-efficiency rationales. 
67. Virtue ethics appears to have heavily influenced Anglo-American law.  See Claeys, supra 
note 19, at 901 (contending that virtue ethics “heavily influenced Anglo-American property 
law”); see also Strang, supra note 20, at 2026.  Virtue-based principles are the basis of 
contemporary private law.  See GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 31, at 1–9 
(1991) (explaining the progression of contract law to its modern state). 
68. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305 (1939). 
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law because it is grounded in principles that could not have shaped 
bankruptcy law.69  The creditors’ bargain model is founded on 
principles derived from the clever insights of efficiency-minded 
academics, such as the effect of bankruptcy discharges on interest 
rates.70  These principles were only “discovered” because the economic 
approach to law requires efficiency-minded academics to look for costs 
to be avoided.71  Efficiency is relevant to bankruptcy law, but it is not 
the only relevant value.72  The creditors’ bargain model cannot provide 
an accurate description of the current state of the law because its 
efficiency-minded evaluative framework is not up to the task.73 
C. The Need for a New Bankruptcy Theory 
Some bankruptcy scholars claim that our bankruptcy laws are the 
product of “social exigency, moral conflict, and political compromise” 
 
69. Efficiency is surely relevant to bankruptcy law, but is not the only relevant virtue.  James 
Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2 (2002) [hereinafter 
Gordley, Moral Foundations] (arguing that the virtues of prudence and distributive and 
commutative justice enable people to live their lives); see also Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, 
supra note 18, at 739–40 (discussing the limitations of the economic account of bankruptcy law). 
70. See Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 8 (discussing attempts to explain the 
doctrine of necessity in terms of economic efficiency); see also Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, 
supra note 18 at 739–40 (detailing the shortcomings of the economic approach); Robert K. 
Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 
13 (1994) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy]. 
71. See Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 6 (“[T]heir economic approach 
requires them to look for a cost to be avoided.”); see also Ronald Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. 
L. REV. 1201, 1205–06 (1977) (discussing consequentialist arguments in the context of debates 
about rights); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 154 (1973) 
(noting that although there was a shift toward an economic model, some judges retained concern 
for traditional concepts like “reasonableness”); Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in 
the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1047 (1978) (noting that while efficiency 
“has been an influential factor in prior law,” it “has not been the only influential factor”). 
72. It is important to note that neither virtue jurisprudence nor bankruptcy law is antagonistic 
toward the economic analysis of the law.  Far from it.  Many Bankruptcy Code provisions require 
judges to promote efficiency and avoid unnecessary costs.  For example, the bankruptcy system 
embraces some overtly utilitarian principles, including the requirement that creditors with a state 
law right to repossess collateral be forestalled from doing so.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).  This 
imposes a cost on the individual creditor in order to maximize aggregate welfare for all creditors.  
In addition, § 363 requires that debtors accept the highest and best offer when selling assets of the 
estate, which courts have interpreted to mean the highest monetary offer.  Id. § 363.  Sections 
327–330 address judicial oversight of the fees for bankruptcy professionals, and are intended to 
help control costs.  Id. §§ 327–330.  Section 105 is often used to justify consolidation of multiple 
bankruptcy cases for procedural purposes, which also helps to reduce costs.  Id. § 105.  Efficiency 
and thrift are both virtues that may apply in bankruptcy.  However, while these goals are not 
anathema to virtue jurisprudence or bankruptcy law, neither are they their raison d’être. 
73. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 78 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1987) (“[T]he 
distancing of economics from ethics has impoverished welfare economics, and also weakened the 
basis of a good deal of descriptive and predictive economics.”). 
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rather than “the logical outcome of ethical principles consciously 
adopted and consistently applied by perfectly rational legislators.”74  As 
a result, these scholars—notably David Carlson—have claimed that it is 
“unrealistic to expect to find ethical principles that would justify all of 
bankruptcy law.”75  Carlson is correct that it is specious to assume that 
any particular theoretical model can possibly explain every detail and 
every rule in an area of law as complex as bankruptcy.76  Nevertheless, 
our bankruptcy laws represent the collective judgments about 
bankruptcy policy that various Congresses have reached over time.77  
This Article assumes that these value judgments are mostly rational and 
“based on logically coherent reasons.”78  Any mostly rational, logically 
coherent system should contain some common principles that have 
some unifying force for that system. 
As such, there are at least two reasons to continue to pursue the hunt 
for a deep structure in bankruptcy.  First, most extant bankruptcy 
theories, including the creditors’ bargain theory, are normative theories 
that seek to offer an authoritative theoretical perspective from which to 
criticize the current bankruptcy system and determine what ends an 
ideal bankruptcy system should seek to achieve.  Most of these 
proposals fail to make any assertions whatsoever about the reality of the 
 
74. Korobkin, Normative Foundations, supra note 18, at 543 (citing David G. Carlson 
Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389 (1987)); see also Warren, Bankruptcy 
Policy, supra note 14, at 778 (“I see bankruptcy as a more complex and ultimately less confined 
process than [Professor] Baird.”).  Bankruptcy is highly politicized and therefore bankruptcy law 
will always have elements that are incoherent from any theoretical prospective.  See Levitin, 
supra note 45, at 1451–58 (discussing the “politics of bankruptcy”). 
75. Korobkin, Normative Foundations, supra note 18, at 543 (1993) (citing David G. Carlson, 
Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389 (1987)); see also John D. Ayer, Through 
Chapter 11 with Gun or Camera, But Probably Not Both: A Field Guide, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 
884 (1994) (asserting that there are different approaches to bankruptcy); Raymond T. Nimmer, 
Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 
36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1023 (1987) (contending that it would be “irresponsible . . . to suggest that 
for all outcomes, special and general protections in bankruptcy can be justified by one, or even 
several overarching policies”); Linda J. Rusch, Bankruptcy Reorganization Jurisprudence: 
Matters of Belief, Faith, and Hope-Stepping into the Fourth Dimension, 55 MONT. L. REV. 9, 16 
(1994) (asserting that the “beliefs and values” at the core of bankruptcy law cannot “be 
subject[ed] to the test of truth or falsity, but are really matters of individual faith and aspiration”). 
76. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the 
Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 441, 
452–53 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy models are merely “gross, oversimplified 
approximations of reality”). 
77. Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 94. 
78. Id.; see also Levitin, supra note 45, at 1405 (suggesting that a proper theoretical 
understanding of bankruptcy must be based on a political theory).  Even at their best, models are 
“gross, oversimplified approximations of reality.”  Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 452–53.  However, 
models have explanatory prowess specifically because of their reductive nature. 
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current bankruptcy system.79  No other theory of corporate bankruptcy 
law has done an adequate job of providing a positive account of current 
bankruptcy law and the equitable principles that have motivated 
corporate bankruptcy law and policy since its inception.80  As such, it 
appears that corporate bankruptcy law is currently “under-theorized,” 
and this Article seeks to fill this gap in the literature.  For many, a 
theory that offers a positive account of our current bankruptcy system 
would be a welcome alternative.81  An alternative account of corporate 
bankruptcy law that is able to tap into insights about the purposes of our 
bankruptcy policies would be even more valuable. 
Second, virtue jurisprudence can provide a useful theoretical 
counterweight to existing corporate bankruptcy theories and prevent the 
terms of the debate from becoming solely focused on any one theory.  If 
this Article’s sole accomplishment is to leave readers with an 
introduction to virtue ethics, and the first glimmers of virtue ethics’ 
potential explanatory power for corporate bankruptcy law, it will be a 
success.  As it stands, corporate bankruptcy scholarship has been 
dominated by the creditors’ bargain approach for some time.82  This is 
not surprising because, with a few notable exceptions,83 there has not 
been a serious theoretical alternative presented.  Unless a vibrant 
alternative theory can be presented, the very terms of the debate may 
continue to shift into the language of economics.84  For those scholars 
who remain doubtful of the benefits of an exclusive and relentless focus 
 
79. See LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1309 (noting that economists 
have failed to explain how they will deal with current problems in implementing their proposals); 
see also Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 116 (asserting that Professor Jackson’s 
“common pool account” of bankruptcy law fails as an explanatory theory); Jody S. Kraus, 
Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of 
Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 358 (2007) (noting that some scholars 
remain “mystified that anyone takes [economic analysis] seriously, especially as an explanatory 
theory” (emphasis in original)); cf. Zamir & Medina, supra note 63, at 391 (suggesting that 
deontologically constrained cost-benefit analysis would make economic analysis “descriptively 
more valid”). 
80. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting that bankruptcy laws force bankruptcy 
courts to consider equitable principles like fairness, honesty, and justice). 
81. But see LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1310–11 (calling for a better 
approach that does not “miss most of the economic interrelationships”). 
82. See Susan Block-Lieb, A Humanistic Vision of Bankruptcy Law, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 471, 472 (1998) (acknowledging that economic analysis has dominated bankruptcy 
scholarship); Claeys, supra note 19, at 893 (same). 
83. Among those offering competing theories are Donald Korobkin, Ronald Mann, Karen 
Gross, and Lynn M. LoPucki.  See, e.g., Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 78–79 
(noting the existence of competing theories). 
84. For some, this is precisely the point.  See LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note 
61, at 1310–11 (suggesting that creditors’ bargain theorists are engaged in “a deadly serious 
endeavor” to dominate the terms of the debate over bankruptcy law). 
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on economic efficiency and ex ante entitlements, a competing 
framework for understanding bankruptcy law would be very valuable.85 
II. VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE AS BANKRUPTCY THEORY 
A. Introducing Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics is the oldest of the three major schools of moral 
philosophy,86 and is rooted in the philosophies of Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas, among others.87  Like alternative theories, virtue ethics is not a 
monolithic approach to moral philosophy.  Nevertheless, most accounts 
of virtue ethics focus on the relationship between law and character, and 
tend to be concerned with the lived experiences of human life.88  They 
tend to offer a normative account of contemporary moral issues 
predicated on encouraging virtues such as fairness, equity, and justice in 
human relations.89  While virtue ethics has ancient roots, it is also 
essentially a new theory, and one that draws on recent developments in 
moral philosophy to update its historical antecedents.90 
Virtue ethical accounts generally focus on how citizens may achieve 
eudaimonia (human flourishing).91  Virtue ethics conceives of 
eudaimonia as the ultimate good: the state of being that all people 
should seek to achieve.92  Virtue ethicists also believe that achieving the 
ultimate good is only possible by acting in accordance with the 
 
85. The debate in the corporate bankruptcy literature parallels debates happening in other 
disciplines as well.  See, e.g., Penalver, supra note 57, at 863–64 (offering virtue ethics as an 
alternative to the dominant law and economics model of property law). 
86. See Strang, supra note 20, at 2017 (recognizing that “[t]he other two competing ethical 
traditions are deontology and consequentialism”). 
87. Other noted advocates of virtue ethics include Confucius, Hume, the Late Scholastics, 
Plato, and the Stoics.  See Rebecca L. Walker & Philip L. Ivanhoe, Introduction to WORKING 
VIRTUE: VIRTUE ETHICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 1, 3 (Rebecca L. Walker & 
Philip L. Ivanhoe eds., 2007) (noting proponents of virtue ethics); see also MACINTYRE, supra 
note 19, at 118 (same); Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 1 (same). 
88. Solum, Theory of Judging, supra note 27, at 179; see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 99 
(discussing the need for a theory that “provides not just an abstract set of principles”). 
89. See Walker & Ivanhoe, supra note 87, at 3 (asserting that while a variety of approaches to 
virtue ethics exist, “all share something in common by offering virtue-based analyses of 
contemporary moral issues”).  Among the various normative approaches to virtue theory are those 
offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, Julia Driver, and Rosalind Hursthouse.  See JULIA DRIVER, The 
Virtues and Human Nature, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?: ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES 116, 116 
(Roger Crisp ed., 1996); HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 28–29; MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 
150–52. 
90. Rosalind Hursthouse’s book, ON VIRTUE ETHICS, offers an excellent introduction to virtue 
ethics.  See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 1–25; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 146–
64. 
91. Eudaimonia is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 21–29. 
92. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 140  (noting the link between virtue and happiness). 
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virtues.93  People must practice acting virtuously and only by repeated, 
conscious efforts to internalize virtuous behavior can eudaimonia be 
achieved.94 
Virtue ethics relies on concepts of vice and, correspondingly, of 
virtue.95  Virtue refers to something like an admirable character trait, 
and simultaneously, to a person’s propensity to act in accordance with 
that character trait.96  Acting virtuously helps a person “fit into” and 
contribute to society.97  Virtuous action requires more than simply 
acting in accordance with the virtues, and is not simply “the result of a 
cost/benefit calculation of utility.”98  A virtuous action is the right 
action taken for the right reasons;99 “right action” requires a unity of 
reason and feeling.100  Vice is the converse.  Vice refers to something 
 
93. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 713 (“At its broadest level, 
Aristotelian virtue causes human beings to be happy and function well.” (citation omitted)). 
94. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 4–5 (1992). 
95. ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS 147 (2000) [hereinafter 
HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS]; see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 
103 (defining Aristotelian virtue as “all-round personal excellence”). 
96. See Peter Koller, Law, Morality, and Virtue, in WORKING VIRTUE: VIRTUE ETHICS AND 
CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 192, 192 (“The concept of virtue refers to 
the character traits of persons, their practical attitudes or dispositions, which have some 
motivating force for their conduct.” (emphasis in original)); see also HURSTHOUSE, supra note 
95, at 147 (“A virtue is . . . a good, or admirable, or praiseworthy character trait . . . .” (emphasis 
in original)); MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 191 (offering a “partial and tentative definition” of 
virtue as “an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to 
achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us 
from achieving any such goods”); Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716 (noting that 
virtue is “just the right amount” of a particular trait (citation omitted)); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Law, 
Virtue, and the Corporation, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 473, 476 (1996) (noting that virtues are “context-
bound” and “cannot be defined in the abstract”). 
97. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 107. 
98. Id. at 109; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149 (arguing that an “educated moral 
agent . . . does what is virtuous because it is virtuous”); Anthony Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal 
Liability, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 193, 195–96.  An example may be helpful.  Honesty is a 
virtue represented by “the ideal of straight dealing, fair play, common knowledge, and open 
inquiry.”  See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 192.  To say that a person has the virtue of honesty 
refers both to the fact that a person generally tells the truth and to that person’s disposition to 
truth telling.  The virtue of honesty is something more than simply the principle “do not lie,” 
because a truly honest person is one that does not even think of lying.  See id. at 194–95.  It is 
also not enough for a person to act out of obligation, fear of punishment, or for similar reasons.  A 
person does not possess the virtue of honesty if she tells the truth for any reason other than 
because telling the truth is the right thing to do. 
99. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149. 
100. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 19, at 28; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 122, 149  
(stating that “[v]irtues just are those qualities which sustain a free man in his role and which 
manifest themselves in those actions which his role requires” and that “[v]irtues are dispositions 
not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways”); Kyron Huigens, On 
Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 214, 
214 (“Virtue, for Artistotle, was . . . a quality of exemplary practical judgment by which the agent 
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like a person’s despicable character traits and a disposition to act in 
accordance with that character trait.101 
Virtues are not abstract concepts.102  In the abstract, virtues lack 
moral content; they gain meaning only in the context of human 
activity.103  Considering a virtue in the abstract renders the content of 
that virtue incoherent and meaningless.104  Put differently, “[v]irtues 
tend to be context-bound.”105  For example, charity is often considered 
to be a virtue.106  However, if a person is overly-charitable, that person 
may be considered foolish.107  Consider both a single parent working a 
low-wage job to support his family and a wealthy socialite who doesn’t 
have such concerns. Charity might require that each contribute a 
personally significant amount to the needy, but the absolute amount of 
each individual’s charitable giving will depend on their particular 
circumstances.  As a result, society might judge the single parent to be 
generous to a fault if he were to give his family’s grocery money to a 
charitable cause instead of buying enough food for his children.  Yet, 
society might consider the wealthy socialite stingy and lacking in 
charity if he donated twice as much to the same cause, because doing so 
does not deprive his loved ones of essential needs, and is a less 
personally significant amount.  Because the virtue of charity is context-
bound, society may fairly expect that the wealthy should contribute 
more to charity than the poor.108 
This example also highlights the Aristotelian concept of the “golden 
mean.”  The golden mean suggests that virtues are just the right amount 
of a particular trait for a particular situation.109  Virtues are not just 
 
does right because the right is what he wants to do . . . .”). 
101. See HURSTHOUSE, supra note 95, at 147 (“[A] vice is a bad, or despicable or 
unpraiseworthy character trait.”). 
102. See Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476 (noting that “virtues are context bound”). 
103. Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 
288, 338 (1993) (noting that virtues “acquire their coherence and meaning only by their unique 
capacity to assist a person to achieve excellence in particular varieties of human activity”). 
104. Id. 
105. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 123; SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 167; Nesteruk, supra 
note 96, at 476. 
106. Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, No More Quandaries: A Look at Virtue Through the Eyes of 
Robert Solomon, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 117, 119 (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA, at pt. II-II, qq. 1–27 (Fathers of the English Dominican trans., 1948)); see also 
HEIDI M. HURD & RALPH BRUBAKER, DEBTS AND THE DEMANDS OF CONSCIENCE: THE VIRTUE 
OF BANKRUPTCY (forthcoming April 1, 2014)) (on file with author). 
107. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text (discussing the golden mean). 
108. The Bible also suggests as much: “For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be 
much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.”  Luke 
12:48 (King James). 
109. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 372 (“[T]he equal is some intermediate between excess 
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labels, but rather involve choices along a spectrum.  For example, the 
virtue of charity requires giving an appropriate amount: not so little as 
to be uncharitable and not so much as to be a spendthrift.110 
Virtues are also role-related.111  As the nature of appropriate action 
differs from role to role, we should expect people who occupy different 
roles to exhibit different virtues.112  For example, we can contrast the 
respective roles of a judge and a legislator.113  Society has very different 
expectations for individuals occupying these positions.  People might 
believe that a Congresswoman who aligns her views with those of her 
constituents on a contentious political issue is doing her job well and 
exhibits the virtue of prudence.114  By contrast, a judge who molded her 
views to those of the electorate would fairly open herself up to claims 
that she had behaved imprudently, perhaps even corruptly.  In part, the 
difference between prudent and imprudent action depends on the actor 
because our conceptions of virtuous action are role-related.  Legislators 
should be responsive to their constituents, but judges should decide 
cases based on principles divorced from popular sentiment.115 
The contextual and role-dependent nature of virtue means that acting 
virtuously requires more than simplistic conformity to a code of 
behavior116 and that virtue cannot be reduced to definite and universal 
 
and deficiency.”); see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716 (“Virtue involves 
making a choice between two extremes . . . .”). 
110. Bravery is the prototypical example used to explain the concept of the golden mean.  The 
virtue of bravery refers to the mean between two opposite choices along the spectrum of 
fearfulness.  At one extreme end of the spectrum is rashness.  Rashness is the state of having a 
deficiency of fear.  At the other end of the spectrum is cowardice.  Cowardice is the state of 
having an excess of fear.  A person having the virtue of bravery has the right amount of fear, 
given her particular situation.  In this way, a brave person may be said to occupy the mean 
between rashness and cowardice.  See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716 
(discussing the virtue of bravery). 
111. MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 129; SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 196 (discussing this 
point and adding that virtues also vary among different cultures); Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476.  
Some empirical evidence suggests that roles are important in explaining behavior.  See, e.g., 
CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY 123–25 (2005) (discussing evidence drawn 
from ultimatum games); Herbert Gintis et al., Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: Origins, 
Evidence, and Consequences, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS 3, 8–18 
(Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005). 
112. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 196–97. 
113. I am indebted to Jeffrey Nesteruk for this example.  See Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476–
77. 
114. Of course, we would also like our Congresspersons to have the virtues of honesty and 
integrity: to tell the truth, avoid shady or illicit dealings, and refuse bribes.  See SOLOMON, supra 
note 21, at 169 (discussing the kind of integrity we hope for in politicians). 
115. Nesteruk, supra note 96, at 476–77. 
116. Virtues “cannot be dictated according to abstract rules or principles.”  SOLOMON, supra 
note 21, at 109, 233.  “There is no simple calculus or decision procedure” for business.  Id. at 
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rules.117  The lack of definitive rules recognizes that a certain amount of 
subjectivity inheres in all decisions, but it does not mean that all 
decisions are correct just because a decision maker says so.  Although 
somewhat fuzzier than deontological or consequentialist decision 
making, virtue ethics can provide guidance to decision makers.  It does 
so through the use of the intellectual virtue known as practical wisdom 
(phronesis), which is discussed further below.118 
B. Three Reasons Why Virtue Jurisprudence Can Undergird a 
Descriptive Theory of Bankruptcy Law 
Virtue jurisprudence offers an interesting new way of thinking about 
bankruptcy law, and is better suited than existing theories to explain 
some of bankruptcy law’s key features for at least three reasons.  First, 
virtue jurisprudence appears grounded in the same values and principles 
that underlie bankruptcy law.119  Second, adopting a virtue 
jurisprudential framework for analyzing how bankruptcy judges balance 
the competing demands of bankruptcy law’s multiple dimensions and 
incommensurable ends can help provide a rich and fulsome 
understanding of the law.120  In particular, phronesis—virtue 
jurisprudence’s decision-making apparatus—can explain how 
bankruptcy judges reconcile these demands and arrive at an appropriate 
decision in a particular case.121  Third, virtue ethics’ simultaneous 
consideration of means and ends can offer insights into how bankruptcy 
judges use their Bankruptcy Code-sanctioned discretion and commercial 
judgment.122  Each is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
179.  Nor is there one for bankruptcy. 
117. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1995); see also 
SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 179 (“[T]hose who try to follow such a calculus or procedure will 
almost inevitably get caught up in its simple-mindedness.”). 
118. See infra Part II.B.2; see also supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
119. See Gordley, Moral Foundations, supra note 69, at 2–5 (discussing the moral 
foundations of private law); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 257 (suggesting that modern 
morality is Aristotelian).  Particularly as compared to the creditors’ bargain theory, virtue 
jurisprudence and bankruptcy law share a notably parallel vocabulary.  See Korobkin, 
Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 739–40 (noting that “the economic account . . . neglect[s] 
bankruptcy law’s unique history and distinctive function[s]”). 
120. Certain values take lexical priority over others despite a claim of incommensurability.  
See Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations, supra note 57, at 1202 (noting the “plural valued approach 
inspired by Aristotle”).  As such, the notion of incommensurability does not mean that two values 
are incomparable.  See generally Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37 (noting that while 
“goods are not assessed along a single metric,” public and private choices can be evaluated). 
121. Phronesis and practical wisdom are used interchangeably throughout this Article.  See 
Feldman, supra note 35, at 58 (noting that phronesis is sometimes translated as “practical 
wisdom”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 153 (discussing phronesis). 
122. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012) (allowing the bankruptcy court to approve a 
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1.  The Shared Language of Virtue 
Both virtue jurisprudence and bankruptcy law evince concern with 
virtues such as honesty, fairness, equity, and justice.123  To some extent, 
these virtues provide a foundation for all law;124 however, bankruptcy 
law appears to draw particularly heavily on notions of virtue.  The use 
of a shared, virtue-centric vocabulary suggests that a greater 
understanding of virtue jurisprudence can lead to insights about the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
For example, both virtue jurisprudence and bankruptcy law 
emphasize virtues such as justice and equity.125  In virtue jurisprudence, 
justice requires that each person receive what he or she is due, which is 
directly proportional to his or her merit.126  Bankruptcy law mirrors this 
conception of justice in its focus on ensuring that similarly situated 
creditors receive equal distributions from the estate, unless they agree 
otherwise.127  In this way, both virtue jurisprudence and the Bankruptcy 
Code evidence a shared concern with justice as equality. 
The creditors’ bargain theory suggests that bankruptcy law should 
focus relentlessly on economic efficiency, thereby ensuring that the 
 
plan if it is feasible, but allowing the bankruptcy courts to define feasibility); see also Matthew 
Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Preliminary Injunction 
Standard for Objections to Section 363 Sales, 62 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2012) (noting that 
bankruptcy judges enjoy an enormous amount of discretion in approving § 363 sales). 
123. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of these concepts 
to virtue ethics); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing specific Code sections 
that draw on these virtues). 
124. Like most law, bankruptcy law was built on the foundations of virtue and crafted by 
lawmakers indoctrinated in the philosophy of virtue.  See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 257 
(discussing the “distinctive kind of morality” of the Aristotelian tradition which is “so 
predominant in modern conceptions of morality”); see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 17 
(“Business . . . depends upon and presupposes the virtues and that basic sense of community and 
minimal mutual trust without which no activities of production or exchange or mutual benefit 
would be possible.”); cf. GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 31, at 1–10 (discussing 
the virtues underlying contract law). 
125. See supra notes 3–7. 
126. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 232 (“The basic idea is that justice has much to do with 
merit—giving each student what he or she deserves on the basis of effort and accomplishment.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
127. The ability to claw back payments to creditors is grounded in an attempt to equalize 
distributions among creditors and avoid the debtor’s ability to prefer one creditor over another.  
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (providing bankruptcy trustees with the power to avoid preferential 
transfers); see also Sydney Krause, Homer Kripke & Charles Segilson, The Code and the 
Bankruptcy Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 292 (1967) (“A cornerstone of the bankruptcy structure 
is the principle that equal treatment for those similarly situated must be achieved.”).  There are, of 
course, many instances where the Code authorizes a departure from this norm.  See, e.g., 11 
U.S.C. § 507 (providing priority payment of the claims of certain special interests).  Nevertheless, 
these exceptions only help prove the rule. 
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pool of assets distributed to creditors is as large as possible.128  This 
theory also suggests that ex ante contract rights should be respected to 
the greatest extent possible.129  While bankruptcy law is concerned 
about efficiency and contract rights, it is also concerned about fairness, 
justice, and other similar principles, and with the notion that the 
enforcement of contracts “should not offend deeply held social 
norms.”130  As a result, virtue jurisprudence may be better suited to 
provide a positive theory of bankruptcy law than alternative theories, 
which have a more limited focus because they do not rest on the same 
foundations.131 
For example, 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g) provides that a court may not 
modify retiree benefit plans unless the court finds that, among other 
things, modification is necessary to permit the debtor’s reorganization, 
all “affected parties are treated fairly and equitably,” and modification is 
“clearly favored by the balance of the equities.”132  The Code’s 
references to fairness and equity are not defined, and courts appear to 
rely, in part, on a virtue ethical definition to give contest to these 
phrases.133  One example is found in the 2006 case of In re Kaiser 
Aluminum Corporation.134 
In that case, the debtors were a corporate group of twenty-six 
companies involved in the aluminum industry (“Kaiser”).  Due to weak 
industry conditions, credit lines that could not be rolled over, ongoing 
asbestos litigation, and legacy obligations to retirees, Kaiser filed for 
bankruptcy.135  While in bankruptcy, Kaiser sought to terminate six of 
its pension plans, which covered more than 13,000 current and former 
 
128. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (explaining that the creditors’ bargain 
model provides that the optimal bankruptcy system should maximize the expected value of the 
assets of the bankruptcy estate). 
129. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
130. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 14, at 780; supra note 5 (discussing specific 
Code sections that draw on these virtues). 
131. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 257. 
132. The relevant text of 11 U.S.C. § 1114(g) reads: 
(g) The court shall enter an order providing for modification in the payment of retiree 
benefits if the court finds that— 
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements 
of subsection (f); 
(2) the authorized representative of the retirees has refused to accept such proposal 
without good cause; and 
(3) such modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and 
assures that all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and 
equitably, and is clearly favored by the balance of the equities. 
133. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum, 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006). 
134. Id. at 330. 
135. Id. at 331. 
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workers.136  If Kaiser were able to shed these obligations, its ability to 
reorganize would be improved, but covered employees would end up 
receiving only those minimum benefits guaranteed by the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the “PBGC”).137 
In determining whether the debtor should be allowed to terminate its 
six pension plans, the court had to decide if the debtor could consider 
these pension plans in the aggregate, or if it was required to consider 
them on an individual basis.  It was undisputed that if the debtor 
analyzed each plan separately, it was not necessary to terminate all six 
in order to facilitate the company’s reorganization.138  In other words, 
the debtor had sufficient resources to meet its obligations under some of 
the pension plans and to reorganize.  Employees who participated in 
plans that were not terminated would receive their full, expected 
benefits in the normal course.  But employees who participated in plans 
that were terminated would receive only the PBGC-guaranteed 
minimum amounts, which were often substantially lower than the fully 
vested pensions due to plan participants.  The statute is silent on 
whether decisions to terminate can be made using an aggregate 
approach or if each plan must be separately considered. 
The Third Circuit allowed the debtor to terminate all six plans despite 
the PBGC’s objection.139  Among other reasons, the court held that the 
plan-by-plan approach advocated by the PBGC was arbitrary and 
therefore inequitable within the meaning of § 1114(g).140  The PBGC’s 
approach was arbitrary and inequitable because it would have forced the 
debtor to pick and choose among similar plans—often involving 
members of the same union—without any standards to guide its choices.  
The court’s focus on avoiding arbitrary and inequitable action reflects 
some of the same considerations that a virtue ethicist would use.  
Although the result was that more employees ended up receiving 
smaller pensions than they might have otherwise, the Third Circuit 
determined that this was the equitable result because it avoided arbitrary 
decision making. 
Although the result in In re Kaiser is not an obviously just result, this 
case is an example of a court speaking in and drawing on virtue ethical 
terms to give content to some of the obligations of the bankruptcy 
courts.  Admittedly, it is counter-intuitive to claim that equity has been 
 
136. Id. at 332. 
137. Id. at 333. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 347. 
140. Id. at 342. 
THE VIRTUE IN BANKRUPTCY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2013  10:50 AM 
2013] The Virtue in Bankruptcy 259 
done when fewer individuals receive the benefits that they anticipated 
receiving.  However, the Third Circuit clearly manifested a concern 
with avoiding arbitrary determinations, which lies at the heart of the 
virtue of equity.  It is also important to note that if the court had 
explicitly considered the virtue of justice, it may well have reached a 
different conclusion.  The In re Kaiser court appeared to use a partial 
conception of virtue jurisprudence to reach its conclusion.  This Article 
suggests that judges should rely more explicitly on virtue jurisprudential 
conceptions of bankruptcy law in order to decide cases involving 
statutes that speak in virtue jurisprudential terms. 
2.  Practical Wisdom 
Practical wisdom is a particular type of virtue—an intellectual 
virtue—that helps order and make sense of the potentially competing 
demands of the other virtues.141  Practical wisdom is particularly 
important to virtue jurisprudence because virtue jurisprudence does not 
offer a definite list of virtues that apply in a particular case.142  Instead, 
virtue jurisprudence offers a method for identifying the relevant virtues 
and for applying these inherently general virtues to particular cases.  
Practical wisdom can be understood as the intellectual quality of 
decision makers that enables them to perform this task well and thereby 
reach the correct result in a particular situation.143 
One way to think about practical wisdom is by considering the 
concept of the virtuous person.144  A virtuous person is one who 
possesses and exercises only the virtues, and who shuns vice.145  
Whether or not such a person actually exists, the virtuous person sets 
the standard for how judges should think about how people ought to 
act.146  In many ways, the virtuous person is a construct akin to the 
 
141. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 174 (discussing practical wisdom). 
142. See supra notes 111–17 (explaining that virtue is contextual and role-dependent, and 
therefore irreducible to a definite rule). 
143. See Solum, Natural Justice, supra note 36, at 84 (“Practical wisdom is the virtue that 
enables one to make good choices in the choosing of legal ends and means.”); see also 
HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 40 (noting that practical wisdom “might be 
required both to interpret the rules and to determine which rule was most appropriately to be 
applied in a particular case” (emphasis in original)). 
144. See HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 148 
(discussing the “virtuous person” concept). 
145. See Solum, Theory of Judging, supra note 27, at 189 (describing judicial virtues); see 
also HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 147 (contending 
that virtuous people condemn those who are “self-interested, mean, callous, cruel, spiteful, 
dishonest, silly and thoughtless, unjust, dishonorable, disloyal, lazy, unfair, irresponsible, 
uncaring, cowardly, materialistic”). 
146. See HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 148. 
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reasonable person standard in contract law: it is a hypothetical decision 
maker against which judges can measure the appropriateness of certain 
actions in particular circumstances.147 
Practical wisdom requires the decision maker to take two actions.  
First, decision makers must identify the relevant virtues.  And second, 
they must consider what decision these virtuous traits would dispose a 
virtuous person to make.148  In easy cases, practical wisdom can be 
regarded as a working theory of the world on which people rely, 
perhaps unconsciously, when making decisions.149  For example, a 
person possessing the virtue of honesty might instinctively return any 
excess change given to them by a clerk after having made a purchase.  It 
is not necessary for a habitually honest person to reflect on the relevant 
virtues and the proper course of actions because they have internalized 
this decision-making process. 
But practical wisdom is also a distinct form of judgment that enables 
a person to bring to bear her past experiences to help inform the right 
action to take in a new situation.150  It can also be thought of as the 
combination of common sense, refined by practice and experience, and 
analogical reasoning.151  In more difficult cases, decision makers may 
need to reason more consciously about the relevant virtues and the 
actions a virtuous person would take.  Put differently, decision makers 
may need to perform a sort of thought experiment to ascertain how a 
person possessing the specific virtues relevant to the particular situation 
 
147. Id.; see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 730–31 (contending that 
virtue jurisprudence can suggest common themes, provide guidance to judges, and give context to 
broad legal standards).  Note that because virtue ethics is context specific, see supra text 
accompanying notes 99–105, the correct way to behave will differ with the circumstances.  See 
Chapin Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, and Virtue Jurisprudence, 71 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 279, 282 (2010) [hereinafter Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences] (asserting that 
practical wisdom “reject[s] formalism in favor of contextualism”); see also MACINTYRE, supra 
note 19, at 123 (noting the context-specific nature of virtues); Sunstein, Incommensurability, 
supra note 37, at 852–53 (contending “most answers must be developed in the context of 
particular problems”). 
148. See Feldman, supra note 35, at 58–59 (contending that “good judgment in the choice and 
pursuit of one’s ends” is a virtuous trait); see also HURSTHOUSE, ETHICS, HUMANS, AND OTHER 
ANIMALS, supra note 95, at 147 (asserting that “[v]irtue ethics assesses people and actions in 
terms of the virtues and vices” (emphasis in original)). 
149. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 195 (stating that virtues become engrained in a person’s 
character); Lawrence B. Solum, A Virtue-Centered Account of Equity and the Rule of Law, in 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 142, 159–60 [hereinafter Solum, Virtue-Centered 
Account] (noting that judges using practical wisdom act unconsciously). 
150. See Solum, Virtue-Centered Account, supra note 149, at 160 (asserting that 
“experience . . . is required for practical wisdom”). 
151. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 175–76 (noting that “[d]ecision making . . . takes 
practice” and that good judgment can only be developed through experience).   
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would behave in that situation.152  Through this experiment, the 
virtuous decision maker engages in a virtue-centered decision process 
and chooses a “correct” decision from among the available 
alternatives.153 
The process by which bankruptcy judges evaluate the multiple 
demands of various potentially applicable but competing bankruptcy 
policies can be usefully compared to practical wisdom.154  Bankruptcy 
courts must do more than simply balance the expected costs and 
benefits of a particular decision.  Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, 
and bankruptcy judges must be able to determine which rule is the most 
appropriate for a particular case and to correctly apply inherently 
general laws to the facts of that case.155  Although this may seem 
simply like guesswork, excellent judges do not simply guess at the 
correct answer.156  Rather, repeated encounters with similar problems 
refine a judge’s ability to analogize to similar cases, which can be 
developed into an internalized set of rules and procedures for deciding 
cases.157 
Although bankruptcy courts are generally required to follow black 
letter law when making decisions, as courts of equity it is expected that 
they must sometimes depart from the law in order to do justice in 
 
152. See Feldman, supra note 35, at 52–53 (noting that “virtue ethics identifies particular 
traits as more or less worthy, asks what sort of acts these traits dispose a person to perform, and 
then rates acts according to whether or not they are of the kind a person possessed of worthy 
character traits would perform”). 
153. This requires a context-specific, deliberative evaluation.  Id. at 53.  It belittles the role of 
judges to reduce such inquiries into questions of maximizing utility.  See id. (noting the necessity 
of context-specific deliberation); see also HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 12 
(noting that virtues become “strongly entrenched” and are difficult to change, keeping a “virtuous 
person” virtuous). 
154. See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 19, at 12 (noting that practical wisdom is 
the “ability to reason correctly about practical matters”). 
155. See id. at 40 (contending that “a certain amount of virtue and corresponding moral or 
practical wisdom . . . might be required both to interpret the rules and to determine which rule 
was most appropriately to be applied in a particular case” (emphasis in original)); Solum, Natural 
Justice, supra note 36, at 173 (recognizing that judges must possess practical wisdom). 
156. Through experience, judges digest and synthesize the various competing concerns and 
considerations involved in common disputes, so that their decision-making may appear 
spontaneous.  See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 233 (noting that the accumulation of precedent 
gives rise to more efficient decision-making).  Acting virtuously develops into a kind of 
understanding as to how to act, but a person must also consciously aim to act virtuously and 
practice doing so.  Id. at 5, 174; see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 105 (discussing the role of 
intuition in bankruptcy decision-making). 
157. See Francis J. Mootz III, Vico’s “Ingenious Method” and Legal Education, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1261, 1277 (2008) (recognizing that “expert practice is the source of formal 
knowledge about practice”). 
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particular cases.158  This is sensible; the existence of consistently 
followed rules helps ensure predictability, certainty, and respect of 
legitimate expectations.159  At the same time, granting bankruptcy 
courts the powers of equity allows them to fill the gaps left when 
legislators draft laws of general applicability.  These powers also allow 
judges to make exceptions in cases where the straightforward 
application of the law would lead to unanticipated or unjust results.160  
In these ways, equity furthers legislative intent. 
Equity is particularly important in the bankruptcy context, where 
bankruptcy judges have more than just the interstitial gap-filling power 
that all courts have.161  Several Code provisions specifically direct 
bankruptcy judges to consider equitable principles.162  In addition, 
section 105 of the Code is also a powerful tool in a bankruptcy judge’s 
equitable arsenal.163  Although several circuit courts have said that 
 
158. See Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“The essence of equity jurisdiction has 
been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities of the 
particular case.”); see also Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic 
Theories of Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 1, 19 (“A common understanding 
of equity is that legal decision makers sometimes ought to depart from the rules in order to do 
justice in particular cases.”); Solum, Virtue-Centered Account, supra note 149, at 143 (same). 
159. In a virtue jurisprudential account of the law, predictability and certainty are provided by 
the use of analogical reasoning, stare decisis, and by focusing on the consequences of decisions.  
See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 858 (“Much of the relevant work here is 
done in two ways: through analogies and through understanding consequences . . . .”); see also 
GROSS, supra note 13, at 217 (noting that “prior decisions and legislative history can help guide 
the decision maker” when while leaving room for individualized justice); MACINTYRE, supra 
note 19, at 232 (contending that questions cannot be answered without prior formulations of 
“rules of justice”); SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 233 (noting that conflicts in law become well 
defined through “accumulation of precedents”). 
160. See Solum, Theory of Judging, supra note 27, at 205 (contending that virtue theory 
allows exceptions for departures from rules); see also Farrelly & Solum, supra note 158, at 19 
(asserting justice can require departures from rules). 
161. Supreme Court cases like Marrama suggest that bankruptcy courts have broad equitable 
powers that non-bankruptcy courts do not enjoy.  See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 
U.S. 365, 375 (2007) (noting that bankruptcy judges are given “broad authority” by § 105(a)). 
162. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012) (providing that prepetition security agreements 
cover related postpetition property unless “the equities of the case” require otherwise); id. §§ 
1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(f)(1)(A) (allowing the rejection or modification of collective bargaining 
agreements and retirements savings plans, respectively, only if “all creditors, the debtor and all of 
the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”); id. § 1129(b) (allowing cramdown unless 
the plan discriminates unfairly, or if it is not “fair and equitable”). 
163. Id. § 105(a) provides: 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate 
to carry out the provisions of this title.  No provision of this title providing for the 
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, 
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to 
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process. 
(emphasis added). 
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section 105 does not change bankruptcy courts into roving courts of 
equity,164 the Supreme Court recently confirmed that section 105 is a 
broad grant of equitable power to the bankruptcy courts.165 
For example, in Malley v. Agin (In re Malley), the First Circuit 
upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision to surcharge the value of an 
otherwise exempt asset as a remedy for a Chapter 7 debtor’s fraudulent 
concealment of assets.166  In other words, the court remedied the 
debtor’s fraudulent failure to identify assets that could have been used 
to repay creditors by depriving him of an asset that he would have 
otherwise been able to keep for his own use.  The First Circuit found 
that the surcharge order was “an appropriate and necessary way to 
vindicate” provisions of the Code requiring full and honest disclosure 
by a debtor of its assets.167  The First Circuit upheld the bankruptcy 
court’s exercise of its section 105 equitable powers, despite the 
 
164. See United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that § 105 
“does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise 
unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity”); see also S. 
Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that “section 105(a) 
does not authorize the bankruptcy court to create rights not otherwise available under applicable 
law”); GROSS, supra note 13, at 227 (“The equitable powers derive from what is actually in the 
Code.”); Timothy E. Graulich, Substantive Consolidation—A Post-Modern Trend, 14 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 527, 553–54 (2006) (emphasizing that “section 105 is not an authorization 
to convert the court into a ‘roving commission to do equity’ and may be used only to implement 
powers already expressed in the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” (citation omitted)); Joshua 
M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision Resolves the Debate 
over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 38 
(2006) (“According to this ‘narrow view,’ § 105(a) ‘does not authorize bankruptcy courts to 
create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a 
roving commission to do equity.’” (citation omitted)). 
165. See, e.g., Marrama, 549 U.S. at 375 (noting bankruptcy judges are given “broad 
authority” by section 105(a)); In re Rodriguez, 396 B.R. 436, 458 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) 
(“Courts . . . have used § 105 to grant plaintiffs a broad range of remedies . . . .”); In re Kellett, 
379 B.R. 332, 339 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court “broadly interpreted” 
the bankruptcy court’s authority under section 105(a) in Marrama); see also GROSS, supra note 
13, at 227 (observing that bankruptcy courts frequently invoke section 105 “when they sense that 
the Code produces an unfair result”); Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a 
Financial Incentive For Creditors to Destroy a Chapter 11 Debtor: Section 1126(e) and Section 
105(a) Provide a Solution, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 189, 211 (2009) (“Section 105 could be 
interpreted to provide broad authority for disclosures of certain credit derivative positions to be 
obtained.”).  The extent of the court’s equitable powers remains hotly contested.  See, e.g., Law v. 
Seigel (In re Law), 435 Fed. Appx. 697 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (June 17, 
2013). 
166. 693 F.3d 28, 28 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Alexander J. Nicas, Malley v. Agin, 
VOLO.ABI.ORG (Sept. 7, 2012), http://volo.abi.org/malley-v-agin (summarizing the case); 
Elizabeth Shumejda, Exempt Assets May Be Surcharged to Remedy Debtor Misconduct, ST. 
JOHN’S UNIV. BANKR. CASE BLOG (Jan. 28, 2013), http://stjohns.abiworld.org/node/173 (same); 
cf. In re Law, 435 Fed. Appx. at 697 (affirming the lower court’s grant of the surcharge motion). 
167. In re Malley, 693 F.3d at 30; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521 (listing debtors’ duties). 
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Bankruptcy Code’s failure to specifically authorize surcharge orders as 
a remedy for section 521 violations. 
The Code does not specifically address how to remedy the fraudulent 
concealment of assets, and the court had to determine what remedy—if 
any—was the most appropriate in this particular case.  The court’s 
process of explicitly considering various potentially applicable and 
potentially competing principles is akin to practical wisdom.  The court 
had to consider its role as a court of equity, its powers under section 
105, the interests of justice for creditors, the debtor’s violation of his 
obligation to be truthful,168 and whether the Code’s silence suggested 
that no remedy was available. 
There is not one clearly correct solution to the problem the court 
confronted.169  Ultimately, the bankruptcy court decided that departing 
from the normal rules (i.e., allowing the debtor to keep his exempt 
assets) was an appropriate sanction for the debtor’s dishonest conduct.  
The court fashioned a remedy to address the debtor’s dishonest conduct 
despite the lack of a specific remedy set forth in the Code.  In the 
absence of clear solutions, and confronted with the need to reconcile the 
competing demands of the Code and equity, courts, like the In re Malley 
court, explicitly reason in a manner reminiscent of practical wisdom.  
This is particularly true in cases where they must consider whether to 
depart from the express statutory text.  For this reason, virtue 
jurisprudence may offer a rich understanding of decision making in the 
bankruptcy courts. 
Even when bankruptcy judges exercise their equitable powers, their 
ability to do justice in a particular case remains constrained.170  
Bankruptcy judges, like other judges, are bound by stare decisis.171  In 
 
168. See In re Malley, 693 F.3d at 29 (finding that the debtor failed to disclose approximately 
$25,000 in assets). 
169. Creditors’ bargain theorists would likely disagree.  Despite the difficulty of measuring 
and comparing the costs and benefits to parties in various hypothetical states of the world, 
creditors’ bargain theorists would likely claim that one state of the world would be the most likely 
to maximize the pool of assets to be distributed and demonstrate the most respect for creditor 
rights. 
170. Their equitable powers are derived from the Code itself.  GROSS, supra note 13, at 227; 
see also supra note 156 (contending that judges use experience and knowledge to make 
decisions). 
171. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 858 (describing the consistency that 
results from using precedent to inform legal reasoning); see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 233 
(discussing the importance of precedent).  Principles of stare decisis serve at least three valuable 
ends.  First, they enhance efficiency.  If appellate precedents are followed, there is no need to 
litigate the same issue repeatedly in different cases.  After a question is decided in an appellate 
court, lower courts in that jurisdiction are obligated to follow that decision.  Second, binding 
appellate precedents foster consistency.  If each bankruptcy judge is free to decide an issue for 
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addition, analogical reasoning172 can be understood both as comprising 
a part of practical wisdom and serving to limit the discretion of lower 
court judges.173  When combined with stare decisis, it should be clear 
that acknowledging that bankruptcy judges have wide-ranging powers 
of equity is not akin to sanctioning subjective and unprincipled 
decisions.174  It does mean, however, that there may be several possible 
outcomes that are all correct because they are the product of virtuous 
decision making.175 
3.  Virtue Jurisprudence Focuses on Both the Means and Ends of the 
Law 
The symbiotic analysis of means and ends is the third leg of virtue 
jurisprudence’s power to elucidate our bankruptcy laws.176  A virtue 
jurisprudential approach requires decision makers to consider two 
questions: (i) what are the appropriate outcomes to pursue in a particular 
case; and (ii) what is the best way to achieve those outcomes.  These 
two questions should not be collapsed into a single inquiry, such as 
 
himself or herself, varying results are inevitable.  The outcome of the legal questions is likely to 
depend on the identity of the judge.  Binding appellate precedents thus foster fairness and equity 
among litigants.  Third, binding appellate precedents foster predictability in the law.  Individuals 
can know the law and base their conduct accordingly.  Lawyers can know the law and advise their 
clients accordingly.  Without binding precedent, the law is uncertain and the benefits of 
predictability are lost.  In re Cormier, 382 B.R. 377, 411 n.41 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2008) (citing 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM BANKR. L.J. 109, 128 
(1997)). 
172. Analogical reasoning is commonly employed by judges to reach the correct outcome in 
cases.  See Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning, supra note 60, at 787 (discussing the manner in 
which judges should reason to produce certain outcomes). 
173. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 852 (dissecting analogical 
reasoning); see also Mootz, supra note 157, at 1293 (stating that analogical reasoning is “properly 
considered a body of knowledge, even though it cannot generate uniquely correct results in given 
cases by means of deduction”); John H. Farrar, Reasoning by Analogy in the Law 2 (Feb. 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://njca.anu.edu.au/Professional 
%20Development/programs%20by%20year/2009/Judic%20Reas%20papers/farrar.pdf (“The 
method used by Common Law judges in deciding cases is a form of practical reasoning, 
combining reasoning by analogy with reasoning by rule and principle.”). 
174. Nevertheless, it is true that “[w]hat counts as ‘fair’ . . . is always in some sense a 
subjective judgment, based not just on the individual feelings and needs of the immediate 
participants, but on the larger collective consciousness as well.”  SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 
209; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 139  (arguing that conceptions of justice are always 
relative and that “[t]here is no such thing as ‘justice-as-such,’” but only context-specific justice 
(citation omitted)). 
175. The lack of a “right answer” does not mean that it is impossible to reach a correct 
decision.  Good judgment requires only that a person make the best decision available by 
following a virtuous decision-making process.  SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 179. 
176. See generally Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 712 (contending that 
“virtue theory reasons about means and ends in a fully symbiotic way”). 
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what is the most efficient outcome.177  Instead, virtue jurisprudence 
offers this method of reasoning about both the means and ends in order 
to explicitly consider both aspects of a problem and arrive at the 
virtuous decision for a particular situation.178 
This means-ends analysis distinguishes virtue jurisprudence from 
other practical philosophies that focus exclusively on the ends to be 
pursued (i.e., consequentialism),179 or on one’s duties under the law 
(i.e., deontology),180 by forcing a decision maker to more explicitly 
account for both means and ends.181  Virtue jurisprudence also differs 
from consequentialist theories of law because the end it focuses on—
eudaimonia—is both an internal and a multi-variable concept.182  As 
such, promoting the ability of each person to achieve eudaimonia may 
involve trade-offs between and among people.183  And different means 
of promoting eudaimonia are likely to affect individuals differently.  
Therefore, virtue jurisprudence denies that all decisions can be reduced 
to a single inquiry without eliding the differential impact that such a 
move would have on distributional outcomes.184 
Because virtue jurisprudence is concerned with distributional 
outcomes, the means that people adopt to obtain particular outcomes are 
as relevant to virtue jurisprudential decision making as the outcomes 
themselves.185  In addition, virtue jurisprudence recognizes that 
 
177. This is, of course, just what the creditors’ bargain theory requires.  See MACINTYRE, 
supra note 19, at 198–99 (contending that the summing of happiness “makes no sense”). 
178. See Cimino, Private Law, Public Consequences, supra note 147, at 299 (asserting that 
the “hallmarks of virtue jurisprudence” include “reasoning over both means and ends, and 
start[ing] from the premise that the ‘right’ result is probably found at the mean between the two 
extremes”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19 at 149 (noting that the exercise of virtue should 
be considered not only a means to an end, but also an integral part of the end itself). 
179. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 113 (distinguishing virtue theory from utilitarianism 
which is a consequentialist theory). 
180. See id. (distinguishing virtue theory from deontological theory). 
181. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 738 (“[U]nder a virtue theory 
approach, a court could more explicitly account for the parties’ intent as to means, as well as 
ends . . . .”). 
182. See Alexander, supra note 28, at 751 (claiming that human flourishing is a multivariable 
concept and that the multiple relevant components of human flourishing are incommensurable); 
see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 178 (noting the incommensurability of “internal goods 
and external goods”). 
183. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 198–99 (“[C]ultivation of the virtues always may and 
often does hinder the achievement of those external goods which are the mark of worldly 
success.”). 
184. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 716 (arguing that “a virtue is not a 
single, universal good in opposition to a single, universal bad”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 
19, at 149 (“The immediate outcome of the exercise of a virtue is a choice which issues in right 
action.”). 
185. See Feldman, supra note 35, at 61; see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, 
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different virtuous decision makers might choose quite different means 
to achieve the same end.186  An important benefit of the virtue 
jurisprudential framework is that it forces decision makers to recognize 
that trade-offs between and among people will likely be necessary.  As 
such, there is not necessarily a “best means” to adopt, just as there is not 
a single outcome to be achieved.  Instead, there are a variety of 
solutions that a court might employ, each with its own benefits and 
drawbacks for particular parties-in-interest.  Virtue jurisprudential 
theories highlight this fact and explicitly encourage the open and full 
consideration of both means and ends. 
The Bankruptcy Code also encourages the explicit consideration of 
both methods and outcomes.187  These Code provisions require a 
decision maker to consider both: (i) the ends to be achieved; and (ii) the 
best way to achieve those ends.  They commonly do so by giving 
discretion to the bankruptcy judge to grant relief if “cause” exists.188  
“Cause” is rarely defined by the Bankruptcy Code.  As such, these 
provisions require bankruptcy judges to consider what standards are 
relevant to its determination and how to apply those standards to the 
facts of a particular case. 
For example, section 1104(a) allows a bankruptcy court to appoint a 
trustee to manage the debtor’s estate if the court determines that 
cause189 exists or because appointment “is in the interests of creditors, 
any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate.”190  
However, the Code does not explain how judges should evaluate the 
interests of creditors, equity security holders, or the vague notion of 
“other interests of the estate.”  Complicating matters further, section 
1104(c) provides that if the court declines to appoint a trustee, it “shall 
 
at 717 (discussing the interrelationship of means and ends).  Virtue ethics’ unique focus on both 
the ends to be achieved and the appropriate means to achieve those ends sets virtue ethics apart 
from deontology and consequentialism.  See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 732 
(“[U]nlike consequentialism and deontology, [virtue] theory has an analytical focus on both the 
means and ends of law.”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149 (discussing virtue theory’s 
focus on means and ends); supra notes 118, 180. 
186. See MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 149 (“[A] number of quite different means may be 
employed to achieve one and the same end.”). 
187. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012); id. § 107(c)(1); id. § 303; id. § 324; id. § 349; id. § 
350; id. § 362; id. § 363; id. § 365; id. § 502; id. § 503; id. § 1104; id. § 1112; id. § 1113; id. § 
1114; id. § 1121; id. § 1129. 
188. See, e.g., id. § 105; id. § 107(c)(1); id. § 303. 
189. Somewhat unusually, § 1104 defines cause.  Id. § 1104(a)(1) defines cause to include 
“fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current 
management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause.”  See id. § 
1104(a)(1). 
190. Id. § 1104(a)(2). 
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order the appointment of an examiner . . . if such appointment is in the 
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of 
the estate . . . .”191  In other words, if a court determines that 
appointment of a trustee is not in the interests of parties to the case, the 
Code explicitly contemplates that the court might still find that 
appointment of an examiner is in the interests of those parties.  But it 
does not instruct the courts on how to make these determinations.  It 
does not explain how courts should evaluate the interests of the parties, 
whether appointment of an examiner or trustee better serves those 
interests, or how to compare potentially conflicting benefits and burdens 
on the parties. 
Although the Code does not explain the circumstances under which 
bankruptcy judges should appoint an examiner rather than a trustee, it 
does provide a process for reaching that decision.  The process set forth 
in the Code requires judges to consider the various interests of creditors, 
equity security holders, and other interest holders (the ends) and 
whether appointment of a trustee or an examiner is the best way to 
achieve those ends (the means).  This means-ends analysis is the correct 
process to follow, but this process does not dictate a “correct” outcome.  
Instead, a “correct” outcome is reached by following this particular 
process.  Similarly, virtue jurisprudence suggests that a “correct” 
decision is the decision made by a virtuous decision maker who 
engaged in a virtue-centered decision process.192 
IV. VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE BETTER EXPLAINS SOME OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S MOST SALIENT FEATURES 
Virtue jurisprudence is a theory that helps to explain both bankruptcy 
law’s broad policy objectives and its specific content.  The three 
examples that follow are areas of corporate bankruptcy law and policy 
 
191. In full, § 1104(c) provides: 
If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then at any 
time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United 
States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of 
an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including 
an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, 
mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by 
current or former management of the debtor, if— 
(1) such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and 
other interests of the estate; or 
(2) the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, 
or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000. 
Id. § 1104(c). 
192. This requires a context-specific, deliberative evaluation.  See Feldman, supra note 35, at 
59 (discussing practical wisdom). 
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that virtue jurisprudence helps explain and that other theories have 
failed to explain (or have failed to even attempt to explain).  Virtue 
jurisprudence is better situated to explain these aspects of corporate 
bankruptcy law because it provides a decision-making framework that 
accounts for bankruptcy courts’ equitable and discretionary powers, and 
because it accounts for bankruptcy law’s focus on virtues other than 
efficiency. 
A. Virtue Jurisprudence Explains Chapter 11’s Focus on Job 
Preservation 
One of Chapter 11’s primary purposes is to preserve jobs.193  Chapter 
11 is most commonly associated with the reorganization of struggling 
business, and reorganization is usually thought to be job preserving.  As 
a result, these two ends—reorganization and job preservation—are 
closely related (if not wholly distinct), and Congress194 and the 
courts195 have clearly stated that job preservation is one of Chapter 11’s 
most important goals.  A number of creditors’ bargain theorists do not 
recognize that job preservation is an important goal that can be achieved 
through our bankruptcy system,196 and even those who acknowledge 
that preserving jobs is important often deny that the bankruptcy system 
is the appropriate forum to deal with such issues.197 
These theorists generally claim that if bankruptcy law favors non-
contractual counterparties (e.g., employees) at the expense of 
 
193. See 123 CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“For businesses, the bill 
facilitates reorganizations, protecting investments, and jobs.”); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, The 
Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1614 (2009) (noting that Chapter 11’s 
“overarching policy goal is to preserve going concerns and jobs”); Chrystin Ondersma, 
Employment Patterns in Relation to Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 237, 239 (2009) (noting 
that failures in Chapter 11 can affect millions of employees); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 
1210 (2005) [hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy] (estimating that, 
in 1994, approximately two million jobs were at risk in business bankruptcies, although this 
included consumer bankruptcy cases). 
194. See 123 CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino). 
195. See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65, 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting 
the “substantial public interest” in preserving jobs (citing In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 
01-00056, 2001 WL 1820326, at *14 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001))); see also GROSS, supra note 
13, at 224 (asserting that “the interests of workers were considered sufficiently important [and 
were] to be treated specially”). 
196. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 15, at 25 n.8. 
197. See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 87 (1995) (“Attempting to save jobs through 
an inefficient bankruptcy regime may therefore have the opposite of its intended effect.”); see 
also Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 185 
(1987) (“[I]t seems strange to worry about problems like those of former workers in bankruptcy 
and not elsewhere.”). 
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contractual claimants (e.g., lenders), then the debtor’s contractual 
counterparties will, ex ante, raise the cost of credit.198  More expensive 
credit will decrease overall economic activity, which will, in turn, lead 
to less job creation.  Thus, bankruptcy laws that focus on preserving 
jobs in specific instances will have the unintended consequence of 
decreasing overall employment in the economy.199 
In some ways, the creditors’ bargain theorists are expressing a 
concern with fairness when they make such arguments.  In business, 
fairness requires “a certain kind of ‘attunement,’ a sense of value and a 
willingness to exchange value for value,” even in the absence of 
objective guideposts.200  Mutual agreement may be one of the only 
objective market signals to suggest that a bargain was fair.201  As such, 
it is possible to conceive of the creditors’ bargain theorists’ focus on 
preserving ex ante contractual entitlements as an attempt to ensure 
fairness for a debtor’s contractual counterparties.  But it is a limited 
concern with fairness, one that is restricted to ensuring the fair treatment 
of a debtor’s contractual counterparties. 
The creditors’ bargain theorists’ exclusive focus on ensuring the fair 
 
198. See Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 70, at 13–14 (“When a bankruptcy 
regime protects certain persons who have dealt with a bankrupt firm, this protection may come at 
the expense of others in society who would have obtained jobs but for the rise in interest rates 
caused by the bankruptcy regime.”); see also Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1987) (“These losses raise the 
cost of risk taking and cause lenders to reduce their willingness to make loans to consumers 
generally.”); Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2005) (“[T]he option of bankruptcy created a moral hazard problem and 
increases the risk associated with consumer lending . . . .”); cf. Joshua Goodman & Adam Levitin, 
Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of Credit: The Impact of Cramdown on Mortgage Interest Rates 14 
(Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research, Working Paper No. RWP12-037 2012), available at 
http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/9403179 (arguing that cramdown raises the cost of credit for 
some borrowers by ten to twenty basis points, but those same borrowers benefit from a sort of 
public insurance in the form of bankruptcy protection).  But see Carlson, supra note 63, at 616–17 
(contesting the claims that additional bankruptcy entitlements increase the cost of credit for 
“good” companies); but see also Feibelman, supra note 9, at 168 n.216 (noting that “the effect of 
a prior bankruptcy in an individual’s ability to obtain credit is not well understood”); Warren & 
Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy, supra note 193, at 1222 (arguing that many creditors 
will not raise the cost of credit because they are mal- or non-adjusting creditors); Zhang, supra 
note 54, at 6 (same). 
199. See Rasmussen & Skeel, Jr., supra note 197, at 87; see also Aghion, Improving 
Bankruptcy, supra note 14, at 852 n.7 (suggesting that a general employment subsidy would be 
preferable to saving jobs by using the bankruptcy system).  But see Warren & Westbrook, 
Contracting Out of Bankruptcy, supra note 193, at 1215 (arguing that alternatives to Chapter 11 
have substantial inefficiencies that may swamp any purported efficiencies from change). 
200. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 210. 
201. See Coleman, supra note 57, at 516 (“Exchanges among knowledgeable, rational persons 
in a free market are generally Pareto superior; rational individuals do not strike bargains with one 
another unless each perceives it to be in his or her own interest to do so.”). 
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treatment of a debtor’s contractual counterparties excludes 
considerations of fairness for non-contractual counterparties, such as 
employees, tort victims, and taxing authorities.202  Nevertheless, if it 
were demonstrably true that Chapter 11’s focus on preserving jobs in 
specific instances decreased the overall number of jobs in the economy, 
it would be reasonable to reconsider Chapter 11’s focus on job 
preservation.203  However, the available empirical evidence does not 
clearly support the conclusions of the creditors’ bargain theorists.204  
But it does suggest that the arguments commonly made about why 
Chapter 11 should not focus on preserving jobs may be overly 
simplistic.205  And even if protecting jobs did raise the cost of 
commercial credit, it is far from clear that these costs are not offset by 
an increase in social welfare that may result because jobs are saved and 
human flourishing increased.206  For example, Joshua Goodman and 
Adam Levitin have suggested that small increases in the cost of credit 
that result from the existence of cramdown may be efficiency enhancing 
because cramdown creates a form of insurance that the market does not 
otherwise provide.207  In addition, the creditors’ bargain theory ignores 
 
202. See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy, supra note 193, at 1220 
(defining involuntary creditors as having “no contractual relationship with the debtor”); see also 
Lucien Arye Bebchuk & Jess M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 908 (1996) (identifying four categories of nonadjusting creditors: 
(i) involuntary creditors, such as tort claimants; (ii) small claim holders, such as customers, 
employees and trade creditors; (iii) taxing authorities and government regulatory claimholders; 
and (iv) creditors who have extended credit on fixed terms). 
203. In any case, it would still be useful to consider why Congress prioritized preserving jobs 
when it enacted Chapter 11. 
204. See Feibelman, supra note 9, at 168 n.216 (noting that “the effect of a prior bankruptcy 
in an individual’s ability to obtain credit is not well understood”); see also Jean Braucher, 
Bankruptcy Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 505 (1994) 
(“The arm-chair empiricism of the law and economics school, driven by free market ideology, is 
bound to be error-ridden.”); Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV & James B. Thomson, Stripdowns and 
Bankruptcy: Lessons from Agricultural Bankruptcy Reform, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
CLEVELAND (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-
9.cfm.  But see Goodman & Levitin, supra note 198, at 2 (discussing the impact of cramdown on 
mortgage interest rates). 
205. See Block-Lieb, supra note 14, at 527–28 (arguing that “claims that bankruptcy law 
should have no goal other than to minimize the cost of debt capital . . . exaggerate[] the absence 
of socially beneficial effects for bankruptcy provisions that protect specific creditor groups”). 
206. See Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 14, at 467 (arguing that bankruptcy’s 
redistributive goals are “sufficiently important to justify slight inefficiencies”); see also GROSS, 
supra note 13, at 129 (presenting arguments in favor of curtailing creditor’s ex ante rights in 
favor of debtor rehabilitation); Russell Hardin, The Morality of Law and Economics, in LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 331, 360 (11th ed. 1992) (noting that “we might have to give up some efficiency for 
other gains”). 
207. See Goodman & Levitin, supra note 198, at 15 (finding that the availability of cramdown 
raised interest rates on certain debtors by 1–2% per month, but noting that this might be 
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that human flourishing is person-specific and that maximizing aggregate 
welfare may have unacceptable distributional outcomes.208  Congress 
may fairly have chosen to tolerate some level of aggregate inefficiency 
in an attempt to preserve jobs and create acceptable distributional 
outcomes, because human flourishing is person-specific.209 
There are at least three other concerns that could have informed 
Congress’ decision to orient Chapter 11 towards job preservation, 
concerns that a virtue jurisprudential understanding of bankruptcy law 
can help to explain.  First, virtue jurisprudence recognizes that the loss 
of jobs can be more than just a side effect of closing a business: it can 
mean the loss of dignity for workers.210  Second, shuttered businesses 
eliminate jobs, jobs that might be critical to a particular community.  
Communities that developed around one large employer can be easily 
decimated if that employer closes its doors and unemployed workers 
move on in search of other work, or seek relief in alcohol or 
narcotics.211  Third, virtue jurisprudence recognizes that the “losses 
flowing from the failure of a business are never completely absorbed by 
the parties who voluntarily elect to make an economic investment in the 
debtor-business.”212  In part, this is because employees tend to be poor 
risk-spreaders because they can usually have only one job at a time.213  
These examples illustrate some of the social costs of business failure 
 
“efficiency-enhancing by creating a form of insurance that the private market does not provide”).  
But see Feibelman, supra note 9, at 160 (contending that “bankruptcy serves the same social 
insurance functions” as many other common forms of insurance and suggesting that these other 
forms may be better vehicles for providing social insurance). 
208. See Zhang, supra note 54, at 52–53 (arguing that it is an “uncomfortable fact that secured 
lending is a double-edge sword: it may benefit our society as a whole, but only if some of its 
members suffer a loss; it improves our well-being sometimes, but causes damage at others”). 
209. See Warren, Untenable Case, supra note 14, at 467; see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 
138 (arguing that “[b]ankruptcy involves much more than maximizing creditors’ recovery”); 
Hardin, supra note 206, at 360 (recognizing that a degree of efficiency may need to be sacrificed 
in favor of other interests). 
210. See Martin, supra note 48, at 482 (recognizing that “job displacement has high social 
costs”); see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 119 (discussing the role of dignity and self-respect in 
the bankruptcy context); cf. Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 70, at 35–36 (suggesting 
that overall dignity among workers is increased when the overall number of jobs is maximized 
because “a person’s self-respect stemming from employment” may increase with time). 
211. See Martin, supra note 48, at 474 (discussing the “moral upheaval of losing a 
community” through job loss, which can eliminate or at least damage the links among people); 
see also Feibelman, supra note 9, at 166 (noting the hard to measure but still important 
“intangible costs, especially emotional costs” associated with financial collapse). 
212. Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 495; see also Ondersma, supra note 193, at 248 (noting that 
workers develop job-specific skills that cannot be easily redeployed elsewhere). 
213. See Zhang, supra note 54, at 8 (arguing that employees cannot mitigate risk through 
diversification); see also Ondersma, supra note 193, at 248 (noting that workers typically gain 
skills particular to only a certain job). 
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that a virtue jurisprudential understanding of bankruptcy requires judges 
to engage with.  Virtue jurisprudence suggests that it is reasonable to 
consider whether shareholders and creditors are better situated to bear 
the costs of business closures than employees and their communities.214  
Virtue jurisprudence’s engagement with such concerns allows it to 
make sense of a focus on job preservation, even if it comes at the 
expense of some aggregate inefficiency. 
However, it may be the case that preserving jobs is economically 
efficient, but that the non-economic benefits are simply hard to 
measure.215  Congress’ acknowledgement that preserving jobs has 
independent value might be seen as building a bias into Chapter 11 
toward a hard-to-measure end because of the likelihood of systemic 
undervaluation by efficiency-minded judges.216  For example, many 
employees make firm-specific investments expecting to share in the 
rents and surpluses of a business, despite failing to protect those 
investments through “direct contracting, personal trust, or 
reputation.”217  In such cases, it would be inefficient (not to mention 
inequitable) to deny employees protections equal to or greater than 
those enjoyed by other creditors because the business should be viewed 
as a joint enterprise created through the owner’s assets and the workers’ 
labor.218  In this way, Chapter 11’s focus on job preservation might be 
viewed simply as taking a wider view of the efficiency rationale for 
bankruptcy and attempting to ensure that bankruptcy law maximizes the 
wealth of all parties affected by financial distress and not just 
 
214. Employees, communities and others are usually deeply invested and may be affected 
deeply or even disastrously by business failure.  They are rarely just disinterested spectators.  See 
SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 122. 
215. See GROSS, supra note 13, at 199 (noting that noneconomic values are “not always 
measured in traditional economic terms”); see also Feibelman, supra note 9, at 166 (noting that 
self-insurance costs are difficult to evaluate). 
216. To be certain, the Code’s protection for parties without formal legal rights (non-creditor 
interests) are derivative in nature and limited in scope, but they certainly exist.  See Warren, 
Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 14, at 355 (“The Code accounts for the rights of other 
parties that a business failure affects by giving a failing company an opportunity to sell itself . . . 
in chapter 7 or to reorganize in chapter 11.”); see also Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 14, 
at 787 (“The bankruptcy system goes so far as to anticipate the consequences of default on a host 
of potential creditors, including . . . future tort claimants who have not yet discovered their 
injuries or their legal rights . . . .”). 
217. LoPucki, Team Production Theory, supra note 18, at 749; see also Francisco Cabrillo & 
Ben W.F. Depoorter, Bankruptcy Proceedings, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 261, 
272 (Edward Elgar & The University of Ghent eds., 1999) (noting that employees may “also 
expect the right to a part of the company assets as indemnity for the loss of their jobs”). 
218. See Martin, supra note 48, at 483 (noting that a joint enterprise is created through the 
owner’s assets and the workers’ labor (citing Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in 
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1998))). 
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creditors.219 
There are costs to closing down businesses, dislocating workers, and 
disrupting communities.220  Virtue jurisprudence encourages judges to 
fully consider these costs, whereas the creditors’ bargain model casts 
these costs as mere externalities.221  Virtue jurisprudence explains 
Chapter 11’s focus on job preservation because it understands human 
lives can be path-determinative and that human flourishing might be 
harmed by actions taken by debtors or their creditors.222  Even 
assuming that closing down a business and selling off its pieces 
increases aggregate welfare, it is likely to hinder the ability of some 
citizens to flourish in the short-term.223  And it can short-circuit “long-
term plans, deeply held commitments, and carefully constructed 
identities.”224  This has a measurable cost, but only a theory that 
recognizes that human flourishing is a phenomenon of actual, living 
human beings,225 and that there is an “organic integrity and coherence 
to its individual experience that resists disassembly and substitution”226 
can fully account for these costs.  Virtue jurisprudence does so.  By 
 
219. See Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 119–20 (“[I]f maximizing social 
wealth is the ultimate ideal, then it becomes unclear why the principle of bankruptcy law should 
be to maximize only the wealth of creditors, rather than all parties affected by financial distress.” 
(emphasis in original)); see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 224 (arguing that § 1113 (relating to 
collective bargaining agreements) essentially forced courts “to take the interests of the 
community into account”); Martin, supra note 48, at 492 (rejecting the notion that non-creditor 
interests cannot be quantified). 
220. See Martin, supra note 48, at 474 n.202 (discussing the “moral upheaval of losing a 
community” through job loss, which can eliminate or at least damage the links among people).  
“Meaningful life work is necessary on a large scale for the long-term sustainability of meaningful 
human existence.”  Id. at 476; cf. Penalver, supra note 57, at 871 (discussing three goals that can 
be accomplished by laws that override private decisions and command land owners to “act in 
accordance with virtue”). 
221. This blindness to the human costs of our bankruptcy policies may be a result of the use of 
a unitary metric of valuation, which ignores the possibility of qualitatively distinct valuations.  
See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 783–84; see also In re After Six, Inc., 154 
B.R. 876, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (indicating the court was “appalled” at the failure to 
consider the debtor’s former employees employment prospects as a relevant factor in choosing a 
successful bid for the debtor’s assets). 
222. “Meaningful life work is necessary on a large scale for the long-term sustainability of 
meaningful human existence.”  Martin, supra note 48, at 476; see also Penalver, supra note 57, at 
871. 
223. See Feibelman, supra note 9, at 166 (noting the negative effects of financial collapse on 
individuals).  But see Rasmussen, Optimal Bankruptcy, supra note 70, at 35–36 (arguing that “the 
longer one holds a job, the more one can prepare for the dislocations which occur if the job is 
lost”). 
224. Penalver, supra note 57, at 881; see also Martin, supra note 48, at 483 n.237 (noting 
scholars who focus on the concerns of workers). 
225. Penalver, supra note 57, at 881. 
226. Id. 
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contrast, the creditors’ bargain model treats humans as possessors of 
welfare, ready to be maximized, but argues—curiously—that 
bankruptcy is not the mechanism by which to promote human 
flourishing. 
Recognizing that job displacement wastes human capital does not 
mean that jobs are always preserved, no matter the cost.  That is neither 
sensible, nor what the Code or virtue jurisprudence requires.  The extent 
to which jobs should be protected depends on various factors, such as 
the harm faced by the laid-off employees (and their families and 
communities), the employees’ ability to protect themselves, and the 
potential harm to creditors and other parties.  It may often be the case 
that after balancing all of the competing values at stake, the business is 
liquidated anyway and jobs are lost.  But focusing on Chapter 11’s jobs 
purpose may help to avoid particularly severe harms to employees, their 
dependents, and their communities, and ensures that harm to laid-off 
workers is fully considered.227  Only virtue jurisprudence addresses and 
accounts for Chapter 11’s focus on job preservation; the creditors’ 
bargain does not. 
B. Virtue Jurisprudence Explains Chapter 11’s Reorganization Bias 
Chapter 11 is biased toward the rehabilitation of financially 
distressed companies and their reorganization into viable, going 
concerns.228  The Supreme Court has stated that the Bankruptcy Code’s 
“fundamental purpose . . . is to prevent a debtor from going into 
liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of 
economic resources.”229  This purpose is also clearly evident from the 
 
227. See Korobkin, Normative Theory, supra note 46, at 105 (discussing bankruptcy law’s 
jobs purpose); see also Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 857. 
228. See 123 CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“For businesses, the bill 
facilitates reorganizations, protecting investments, and jobs.”); see also LYNN M. LOPUCKI, 
COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS 184 (2005) (noting that in “the United States, managers have the option or reorganizing 
the firm”); Martin, supra note 48, at 436 n.26 (“[A]s long as rehabilitation is possible, it is clearly 
preferable to liquidation.”); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 
B.C. L. REV. 129, 143 (2005) (noting that the “1978 Act was designed to provide ‘bankrupt 
businesses another opportunity to survive’” (citation omitted)); David Hahn, Concentrated 
Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganizations 2 (Bar-llan Univ. Working Paper No. 6-03, 
2003), available at http://www.biu.ac.il/law/unger/wk_papers.html (noting that in the United 
States, “financially ailing firms turn to reorganization and file a bankruptcy petition under 
Chapter 11”). 
229. NLRB. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 9505925, 
at 200 (1977)); see also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(noting that the “paramount policy and goal of Chapter 11, to which all other bankruptcy policies 
are subordinated, is the rehabilitation of the debtor”); GROSS, supra note 13, at 138 (“Bankruptcy 
involves much more than maximizing creditors’ recovery as measured in dollars and cents.”). 
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Code itself.  Some of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that foster the 
rehabilitation of debtors include: (i) the automatic stay of most actions 
against the debtor, its properties, and properties in the possession of the 
debtor upon commencement of a Chapter 11 case;230 (ii) the debtor’s 
broad authority to obtain post-petition financing;231 (iii) the authority to 
reject unfavorable executory contracts;232 (iv) an expansive definition of 
“property of the estate”;233 (v) broad powers to recover property of the 
estate removed from the debtor’s possession in the months and years 
leading up to the commencement of a Chapter 11 case;234 and (vi) the 
debtor’s broad powers to administer its bankruptcy case, including the 
exclusive right to file a proposed plan of reorganization.235 
Chapter 11’s reorganization bias has puzzled some theorists who 
subscribe to the creditors’ bargain model.236  These theorists suggest 
that when the residual owners of a firm would prefer an outright sale of 
the firm to the highest bidder, allowing a company to be reorganized is 
inappropriate.237  These theorists assume that if the firm’s residual 
owners prefer liquidation, then liquidation would maximize the 
economic value of the firm.238  They frequently suggest that Chapter 11 
is flawed because it allows existing management to seek to reorganize 
the company even when reorganization is not value maximizing for the 
residual owners.239 
 
230. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 
231. Id. § 364. 
232. Id. § 365. 
233. Id. § 541. 
234. Id. §§ 542–550; see, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 
1982) (holding that a Chapter 11 debtor can require the Internal Revenue Service to turn over 
tangible property seized by it), aff’d, 462 U.S. 198 (1983). 
235. 11 U.S.C. §1121. 
236. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 127, 128 (1986) (“[T]he entire law of corporate reorganizations is hard to justify under any 
set of facts and virtually impossible when the debtor is a publicly held corporation.”); see also 
Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 489 (1992) 
[hereinafter Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk] (asserting that “there is no need for bankruptcy 
reorganization, which serves no purpose other than reorganization”); Aghion, Economics of 
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 14, at 529 (“We believe that there are serious theoretical and 
practical problems with Chapter 11.”); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1050–52 
(advocating the repeal of Chapter 11); Jackson, supra note 14, at 894 (“Reorganization 
proceedings provide nothing more than a method by which the sale of an enterprise as a going 
concern may be made to the creditors themselves.”); Hahn, supra note 228, at 2 (noting the 
“continuous questioning” of reorganization under Chapter 11 by commentators). 
237. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 236, at 145. 
238. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 228, at 28–29; see also Woo, supra note 53, at 1618, 1623 
(noting the “standard assumption of value maximization”). 
239. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 228, at 29; see also Aghion, Economics of Bankruptcy 
Reform, supra note 14, at 529 (“Chapter 11 mixes two decisions together: the decision of who 
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Creditors’ bargain theorists commonly offer two explanations for 
why management would seek to reorganize a company when its 
creditors (normally its secured creditors) believe that liquidation would 
be value maximizing.  One claim is that existing management may be 
attempting to keep their jobs, if even for only a short time, by choosing 
to reorganize.240  Because these (managerial) job-preserving 
reorganization attempts are said to come at the expense of the residual 
owners,241 many have called for the repeal of Chapter 11’s 
reorganization provisions.242 
Another persistent claim is that Chapter 11’s reorganization 
provisions encourage shareholders of financially distressed firms to 
make inefficient production and investment decisions.243  Specifically, 
they encourage shareholders to “underinvest” in positive net value 
projects and “overinvest” in high-risk/large-return projects.244  The 
 
should get what . . . and the decision of what should be done with the firm.”); Bradley & 
Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1050–52 (arguing that Chapter 11 exclusively serves the interests 
of incumbent management to the detriment of all security holders).  But see LoPucki, 
Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1307 (suggesting that the work of the creditors’ 
bargain theorists is unrealistic); but see also Tabb, supra note 17, at 808 (rejecting the notion that 
Chapter 11 should be repealed). 
240. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1050–52; see also Aghion, 
Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 14, at 529 (noting that management may desire to 
“tilt the outcome of the bargaining toward reorganization (and the retention of their jobs)”); Alan 
Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1824–25 
(1998) (noting that the firm “prefers the bankruptcy system that permits it to consume the most 
private benefits”).  But see Woo, supra note 53, at 1661 (asserting that bank regulation can 
explain decisions to pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing); 
see also Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 484 (noting that “empirical evidence reveals that more often 
than not the first thing to occur in public company reorganizations is the removal and replacement 
of old management”); Tabb, supra note 17, at 858 (same). 
241. The creditors’ bargain theorists’ assertion that reorganizations come at the expense of the 
residual owners is premised on the assumption that the residual owners will always seek to 
maximize the value of their assets.  See Woo, supra note 53, at 1616.  This assumption has been 
severely critiqued, and is, at best, unreliable.  See id. at 1617 (asserting that bank regulation can 
explain decisions to pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing). 
242. An illustrative list of such writings include: Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk, supra note 236, 
at 489; Baird, supra note 236, at 128; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1043; and  
Jackson, supra note 14, at 223. 
243. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1052–53.  But see George G. Triantis, 
A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 920 
(1993) (suggesting that bankruptcy courts exercise judicial supervision to ensure value 
maximizing investment decisions). 
244. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1053; see also Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334–37 (1976) (discussing the incentive effects associated with 
debt); Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 155 (1977) 
(noting that the existence of corporate debt can “reduce the present market value of the firm by 
weakening the corporation’s incentive to undertake good future investments”); David A. Skeel, 
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alleged reason for these inefficient investments is that the minimal 
returns yielded by low-risk projects will be devoted largely to paying 
down debt obligations and that only high-risk projects offer any hope of 
providing a return to shareholders of a financially distressed 
company.245 
Neither explanation appears to capture why Congress has favored 
reorganization.  This is unsurprising because both of these claims 
depend on unreliable assumptions246 and limited empirical evidence.247  
Such evidence that does exist does not appear to support the creditors’ 
bargain theorists’ claims.248  The economic analysis of law does not 
seem to be able to explain Chapter 11’s reorganization bias and so it has 
limited itself to critiquing Congress for having favored reorganization.  
But since the creditors’ bargain theorists’ normative conclusions are 
premised on shaky foundations, alternative explanations may be well-
 
Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
917, 935 (2003) (discussing the risk of overinvestment). 
245. See Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A 
Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669, 708 (1993) [hereinafter Korobkin, 
Unwarranted Case] (“Economists observe that, in a capital structure with risky debt, shareholders 
may have incentives to reach investment and production decisions that are inefficient from the 
perspective of maximizing firm value.”); see also Zhang, supra note 54, at 65–67 (discussing the 
underinvestment problem). 
246. See, e.g., Woo, supra note 53, at 1661 (asserting that bank regulation can explain 
decision to pursue liquidation even when reorganization would be value maximizing). 
247. The most common explanation for a managerial preference for non-value maximizing 
reorganizations is that it allows existing management to keep their jobs, if even for only a short 
time.  However, empirical evidence suggests that senior managers usually suffer a loss of their 
jobs shortly before or soon after entering Chapter 11.  See, e.g., Ponoroff, supra note 76, at 484 
(noting that “empirical evidence reveals that more often than not the first thing to occur in public 
company reorganizations is the removal and replacement of old management”); see also Lois 
LoPucki & William Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly-Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 685 (1993) (same); LoPucki, 
Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1313 (same); Ondersma, supra note 193, at 247 
(same); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Search for Hercules: Residual Owners, Directors, and 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1445, 1448 (2004) (same). 
248. Evidence suggests that the efficiency effects of reorganization are ambiguous.  Robert 
Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. 
FIN. 1189, 1209 (1991); see also Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 
Liquidation vs. Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. FIN. 1253, 1269 (2006) (studying almost 300 
corporate bankruptcy cases from Arizona and New York filed between 1995 and 2001 and 
concluding that reorganization appears to preserve asset values better than liquidations); Stuart C. 
Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate 
Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 355 (1990) (suggesting “that 
corporate default engenders significant changes in the ownership of firms’ residual claims and in 
the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources”); Korobkin, Unwarranted Case, supra 
note 245, at 708–11 (providing a detailed discussion of Gertner and Sharfstein’s work as it relates 
to this claim); Skeel, Jr., supra note 244, at 935 n.66 (discussing empirical evidence suggesting 
that the underinvestment/overinvestment problem is something of a red herring). 
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taken. 
By contrast, virtue jurisprudence is able to offer a positive 
explanation for Chapter 11’s reorganization bias.249  Unlike the 
creditors’ bargain and its narrow focus on economic efficiency, virtue 
jurisprudence simultaneously focuses on promoting multiple virtues and 
choosing the right means to do so.  Whereas the economic analysis of 
law tends only to focus on bankruptcy law’s effect on contractual 
counterparties,250 virtue jurisprudence considers the laws’ effects on 
both contractual and non-contractual counterparties.251  When 
bankruptcy judges are called on to evaluate non-monetary interests, 
such as the interests of the local community, they may believe that they 
lack an adequate medium to compare these interests with potentially 
competing economic concerns.252  Although nothing inherent in 
economic theory forecloses consideration of non-contractual interests, 
non-contractual interests regularly receive short shrift in approaches 
based on economic theory.253 
Chapter 11’s reorganization bias can be viewed as an 
acknowledgement that it is difficult to make precise ex ante predictions 
about the efficiency of various economic arrangements, and that 
decision makers tend to elide hard-to-quantify costs or benefits.254  
These valuable, but difficult to quantify ends include “maintaining 
 
249. It is certainly true that if “welfare” were given a sufficiently capacious definition, the 
economic analysis of law might also be able to explain Chapter 11’s reorganization bias.  The 
point of this Article is not to suggest that virtue ethics is the only theory that can explain 
bankruptcy law, but that it does a better job than the existing theories.  This Article does suggest, 
however, that the creditors’ bargain theory gives short shrift to non-economic stakeholders and 
non-creditor interests. 
250. See James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy’s Law: 
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097, 2143 
(1990) (noting that the common-pool analysis “is premised on the unspoken assumption that if 
the market value of the debtor’s estate is maximized everything will be hunky dory”); Martin, 
supra note 48, at 437 n.31 (noting that law and economics scholars typically ignore concerns 
about community interests). 
251. Bankruptcy may also be conceived as prioritizing future economic growth over short-
term economic gains.  See GROSS, supra note 13, at 138 (“Bankruptcy is concerned with 
rehabilitating debtors, which may not benefit creditors’ short term recovery.”). 
252. Cf. Hon. Barry S. Schermer, Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the 
Community into Account in Bankruptcy—A Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1049, 1051 (1994) (discussing problems with adequately considering community interest). 
253. See James W. Bowers, Wither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, 
and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 37 (1991) (discussing 
contractual interests). 
254. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 228, at 144 (“Such provisions reflected Congress’ 
intent to balance the interests of all parties involved in the Chapter 11 reorganization process.”); 
see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 195, 199, 208 (taking the view that certain societal goods 
cannot be measured in economic terms). 
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employment, preserving the local tax base, and advancing community 
stability.”255  Virtue jurisprudence can account for the need to consider 
each of these goals because of the means-ends symbiosis.  In addition, 
practical wisdom provides a method for reconciling the competing 
demands of corporate bankruptcies.  Through the use of practical 
wisdom and by simultaneously considering means and ends, a virtue 
jurisprudential account can provide appropriate consideration of 
contractual and non-contractual interests.  Chapter 11’s reorganization 
bias can be seen as an attempt to preserve the positive externalities of 
reorganization despite the difficulty in balancing competing, and 
perhaps inconsistent, goals.256 
C. Virtue Jurisprudence Explains Chapter 11’s Examiner Provisions 
Individual preferences are not exogenous; human beings have some 
control over shaping their own preferences.257  The endogeneity of 
human preferences leaves room for the law to actively educate citizens 
in virtue.258  Aristotle believed that one of the law’s central roles was to 
encourage a virtuous citizenry.259  But he believed that the law should 
do more to encourage virtue than merely prohibiting certain actions 
with the hope that citizens will avoid those actions out of fear of 
punishment.260  As previously discussed, the virtuousness of action is 
not judged by compliance with some set of pre-existing rules.261  
 
255. Warren & Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11, supra note 57, at 625; see also 123 
CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (“For businesses, the bill facilitates 
reorganizations, protecting investments, and jobs.”); In re Motors Liquidation, 430 B.R. 65, 84 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting the ‘“substantial public interest in preserving the value of TWA 
as a going concern”’ (citing In re Trans World Airlines, No. 01-00056, 2001 WL 1820326, at *14 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2001)); GROSS, supra note 13, at 195; Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 15 at 282–
83 (arguing that law and economics undervalues non-contractual relationships); Martin, supra 
note 48, at 437 n.31 (noting that law and economics scholars typically ignore concerns about 
community interests); Tabb, supra note 17, at 804 (noting the relevance of community interests). 
256. See Martin, supra note 48, at 445 (discussing the consideration of “general societal 
interests”). 
257. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 355 (“Though apparently there are many ends, we 
choose some of them . . . .”); see also Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations, supra note 57, at 1207–08 
(noting that “we have some control over the shaping of our tastes”). 
258. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 822 (noting the “effects of law on 
social attitudes”); see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 154 (noting that some virtues can be 
acquired through teaching). 
259. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 348 (asserting that happiness should be acquired for 
people and cities through virtue); see also Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 715 
(“Aristotle believed the most proper and central role of government was to make its citizens 
virtuous.”). 
260. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 23, at 445–47 (discussing moral education). 
261. Penalver, supra note 57, at 865; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 153 (asserting 
that “[t]he solution is the result of rough and ready reasoning” rather than the “application of a 
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Therefore, to help citizens become virtuous, the law should provide a 
framework that supports and encourages good decision making by 
citizens.262 
One way of educating citizens and developing a supportive 
framework for their virtuous development is by showcasing examples of 
both virtuous and non-virtuous action.263  The Bankruptcy Code 
provisions regarding examiners can be seen as one way that bankruptcy 
law works to instill virtue in citizens.264  An examiner is an individual 
appointed in a bankruptcy case to perform certain specified duties, 
including investigating “the acts, conducts, assets, liabilities, and 
financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business 
and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other 
matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.”265  In short, 
examiners can help root out malfeasance, and also help parties-in-
interest decide whether a business can be successfully reorganized.266  
By exposing prior instances where parties have acted inappropriately 
and criticizing those actions, the Code’s examiner provisions can help 
teach future actors to make virtuous decisions.267  This is not about 
punishment; examiners who ferret out past wrongful actions do not 
prosecute those who have acted wrongfully.268  Instead, the 
 
rule”). 
262. Laws “cannot compel people to realize moral goods. . . . Their contribution to making 
men moral must be indirect.”  Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Limits, in 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 1, 45. 
263. See Cimino, Virtue and Contract, supra note 22, at 731 (noting the state’s obligation to 
educate its citizens in virtue). 
264. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012), which provides, in relevant part: 
[A]t any time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the 
United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the 
appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is 
appropriate, including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, 
incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the 
affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor, if—(1) such 
appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other 
interests of the estate; or (2) the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than 
debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000. 
265. Id. § 1106(a)(3). 
266. Examiners have other purposes as well, such as uncovering potential causes of action for 
the estate to pursue.  See, e.g., Order Directing Appointment of an Examiner Pursuant to Section 
1104(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555, slip op. at 
3–5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2009) (ordering an examiner to investigate whether there were any 
colorable causes of action arising from the failure of Lehman Brothers). 
267. Although it might also be seen as a stick with which to threaten future actors, acting out 
of fear of punishment is not virtuous.  Virtuous behavior requires taking action for the right 
reasons. 
268. Typically causes of actions uncovered by examiners are prosecuted, if at all, by the 
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appointment of examiners can serve to teach the right way to act by 
highlighting non-virtuous actions.269 
By contrast, the creditors’ bargain model would conceive of the 
question of whether to appoint an examiner as an option to be weighed 
via cost-benefit analysis.  Creditors’ bargain theorists would suggest 
that an examiner should not be appointed unless he or she is likely to 
uncover enough colorable causes of action such that appointment would 
essentially earn the estate a profit.  Unfortunately, this view has taken 
root in certain courts.270  This view appears to misunderstand both the 
history of the examiner provisions271 and the statutory text.272  The 
appointment of an examiner is mandatory in cases where the debt 
threshold has been met and a party in interest or the United States 
Trustee requests appointment.273 
The mandatory nature of examiner appointments cannot be explained 
through an efficiency analysis, but it can be understood from a virtue 
jurisprudential perspective.274  The law can help shape preferences—
and therefore actions.275  Examiners serve to increase human flourishing 
by helping to make the many who are not virtuous more so by “shaming 
them, habituating, teaching, and then ultimately persuading them.”276  
 
representatives of the unsecured creditors’ committee. 
269. The Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to examiners came about as part of a 
compromise in which the SEC took a step back from the active role it had under Chapter X of the 
Chandler Act.  See Lipson, supra note 193, at 1638 n.117; see also Warren, Untenable Case, 
supra note 14, at 469.  Although the role of the SEC diminished, the appointment of an examiner 
was intended to fulfill some of the duties that the SEC had previously played.  See Lipson, supra 
note 193, at 1627. 
270. See, e.g., In re Rutenberg, 158 B.R. 230 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re GHR Cos., Inc., 
43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re Shelter Res. Corp., 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1983). 
271. See Lipson, supra note 193, at 1627 (noting that Congress created the examiner position 
to be, in part, a proxy for the “investigative functions played by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and mandatory trustee under prior law”). 
272. See, e.g., Walton v. Cornerstone Ministries Invs., Inc., 398 B.R. 77, 82 (N.D. Ga. 2008) 
(noting that the meaning of the statutory text ‘“depends on context”‘ (citation omitted)). 
273. See, e.g., In re Revco D.S., Inc. 898 F.2d 498, 501 (6th Cir. 1990); Cornerstone 
Ministries Invs., Inc., 398 B.R. at 84; In re Loral Space & Comm., Ltd., No. 04-8645, 2004 WL 
2979785, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2004); In re UAL Corp., 307 B.R. 80, 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2004); In re Mechem Fin. of Ohio, Inc., 92 B.R. 760, 761 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re The 
Bible Speaks, 74 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).  But see In re Residential Capital, LLC, 
474 B.R. 112, 118–20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating, in dicta, that appointment is not 
mandatory). 
274. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 7 (“[I]f one thinks of business as a ‘dog-eat-dog’ fight 
for survival or calculates all business decisions in the limited language of cost/benefit analysis, 
unethical behavior is bound to follow.”). 
275. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 822 (noting “the effects of law on 
social attitudes”). 
276. Claeys, supra note 19, at 919–20; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 19, at 154 
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Being more explicit about enshrining additional obligations to act 
virtuously into the law would help to constrain the behavior of non-
virtuous actors, and over time, “teach them to act virtuously of their 
own accord.”277 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy law and policy is formed and operated in a world that has 
imperfect markets, imperfect information, and significant transaction 
costs.278  Chapter 11 reflects these imperfections and messy realities, 
but few of the hypothetical bankruptcy models offered up by creditors’ 
bargain theorists do the same.  And yet, creditors’ bargain theorists 
often compare their over-simplified, hypothetical bankruptcy models, 
such as Chameleon Equity279 or Contingent Equity,280 with our current 
system—Chapter 11.281  Based on such comparisons, it is no wonder 
that they take the view that Chapter 11 is costly, cumbersome, and in 
need of significant reform, if not outright repeal.282  However, while 
there is a lot to learn from thought experiments into hypothetical 
bankruptcy structures, it is important to extrapolate those conclusions 
back into the real world before making policy choices.283  
Unfortunately, this crucial, final step is often omitted, impairing our 
ability to compare the idealized theories derived from the creditors’ 
bargain model to our actual bankruptcy laws.284 
The creditors’ bargain model seems ill-equipped to account for 
Chapter 11’s complexities.  By contrast, virtue jurisprudence has the 
ability to offer useful insights about under-theorized aspects of 
 
(discussing moral education). 
277. Penalver, supra note 57, at 871. 
278. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors 
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 81–82 (1992) (criticizing economic analysis for 
its assumption of “perfect capital markets and zero transaction costs”). 
279. Adler, Financial and Political Theories, supra note 14, at 312, 327. 
280. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 14, at 1079. 
281. See Butler & Gilpatric, supra note 15, at 277; cf. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 220 
(stating that virtue ethics confronts “the darkest dogma of traditional business thinking, the 
impoverished idea of Homo economicus who has no attachments or affects other than crude self-
interest and the ability to calculate how to satisfy that interest vis-à-vis other people”). 
282. See, e.g., Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk, supra note 236, at 489; Bradley & Rosenzweig, 
supra note 14, at 1052–53. 
283. See LoPucki, Reorganization Realities, supra note 61, at 1311 (noting that Professor 
Adler has referred to Chameleon Equity as a “thought experiment”). 
284. See id. (“Most economists are bad at reality; their simplistic models do not begin to 
capture phenomenological reality.”); see also Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 14, 
at 379 (“We must consider bankruptcy policies in light of their application to cases that arise in 
the real world.”). 
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bankruptcy law.  By focusing on achieving a just result, the bankruptcy 
judge can quiet the chaos of financial distress that is often occasioned 
by a bankruptcy filing.  The bankruptcy judge can help prevent creditors 
(and debtors) from aiming at cross-purposes because they lack a larger 
perspective as to their effects on the enterprise.285 
In light of the frailty of human institutions, a consequentialist 
approach that seeks to distill every competing claim to a dollar figure 
(or some imaginary unit of welfare) and compare such claims on that 
basis may be the best way to promote human flourishing.  It may be 
that, in order to overcome certain institutional weaknesses, we should 
resolve disputes by comparing claims according to a unitary metric, 
even though this will not reflect a fully adequate understanding of those 
claims.286  “[Assuming commensurability] makes things simple and 
orderly where they would otherwise be chaotic.  In certain areas of the 
law, this may be a decisive advantage, all things considered.”287  If this 
is the argument that creditors’ bargain theorists wish to make, then they 
must make it.  Creditors’ bargain theorists must claim that they can do 
better than any other system, or they must aim to do less.  But it is for 
creditors’ bargain theorists to prove that their vision of the world is 
practically superior, despite being non-ideal. 
Until recently, virtue ethics had more or less fallen out of favor.  
Deontological and consequentialist theories ruled the philosophical and 
legal academy, and the creditors’ bargain model dominated the 
corporate bankruptcy literature.  Virtue ethics was rarely even 
mentioned.  This seems, in part, because “[b]oth deontological ethics 
and utilitarianism stress the importance of broad general principles, 
which can then be applied to particular cases.”288  Whereas, it is the 
nature of virtue ethics “to start with the particular community and 
context and understand cases (and abstract principles) within that 
community and context.”289  Similarly, the Code often requires that 
bankruptcy judges make context-bound decisions in the exercise of their 
discretion. 
One of the primary aims of this Article is to introduce virtue ethics 
into the corporate bankruptcy literature and to offer it as the right kind 
of theory to provide a way to understand the day-to-day dynamics of 
 
285. See Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values, supra note 18, at 773 (noting that the bankruptcy 
process can be constructive for its participants). 
286. Cf. Colin Farrelly, Civic Liberalism and Judicial Review, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE, 
supra note 35, at 107, 129. 
287. Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 37, at 853. 
288. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 113. 
289. Id.; see also Farrelly, supra note 286, at 129. 
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bankruptcy law.  Virtue ethics is less determinate than the creditors-
bargain theory.  But the inability to formulate general rules or 
prescriptions that can be followed in all situations is a result of virtue 
ethics’ recognition that “much depends on the historical, cultural, 
economic and political situation of any given society.”290 
This Article has argued that virtue jurisprudence offers a potentially 
rich and fruitful descriptive account of the nature, means, and ends of 
bankruptcy law.  It also has the potential to offer a unifying normative 
theory of bankruptcy law—a theory that simultaneously resolves some 
of the problems of existing theory and poses a new set of challenges.  
This next step will be addressed in a follow-up article.   
 
 
290. Farrelly, supra note 286, at 129; see also GROSS, supra note 13, at 216 (discussing 
“contextualized decision making”). 
